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This study explores the early-stage strategies that support the creation and growth 
of peer-to-peer marketplaces, a particular type of two-sided marketplace. Prior research 
on two-sided marketplaces has studied well-established firms and has not produced 
systematic evidence of the origins of two-sided marketplaces when a critical mass of 
participants has not yet been recruited. Moreover, its focus on formal economic models 
and price structures provides only a limited understanding of the early stage strategies 
that create value, recruit initial participants, and induce their interactions. I address 
limitations of prior research through an inductive multi-case study of ten peer-to-peer 
marketplaces. Findings suggest host firms create value and recruit initial participants by 
promoting and monitoring marketplace participants’ conformity with appropriate 
behaviors. In doing so, they exercise different levels of control (low, average, or high) on 
two dimensions: a) supply-side heterogeneity and b) cross-side interactions. Considering 
the interactions of these two dimensions, I propose a typology of nine value-creating 
activities. Patterns in the sequence in which host firms pursue these activities over time 
reveal two alternative and “equifinal” paths to promoting participant conformity and 
ultimately to generating growth. Emergent theory extends literature on resource 
orchestration to entrepreneurial firms and contributes to research on new forms of 
organizing.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In their modern form, firms in two-sided markets operate as intermediaries that 
use technology to enable direct interactions between interdependent supply-side and 
demand-side participants, and alleviate bottlenecks for transacting parties (Rochet & 
Tirole, 2006; Hagiu & Wright, 2014).  Their survival and growth depends on inducing 
the participation of a critical mass of participants, and on capturing value from participant 
interactions (Armstrong 2006; Eisenmann, Parker and van Alstyne, 2006; Rochet & 
Tirole, 2003b; 2006). To do so, host firms (i.e. the intermediaries) must first resolve the 
chicken-and-egg problem inherent in all markets with network externalities, that is the 
challenge of recruiting initial participants when the value participants derive from 
transacting within the marketplace depends on the number of other participants already in 
the network (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). In two-sided marketplaces, this challenge is 
particularly acute because network externalities exist on both the supply-side and 
demand-side of the marketplace. Yet, host firms must somehow create value for initial 
participants and recruit them in the absence of compelling levels of value derived from 
the size network. This study addresses the lack of systematic evidence and theory on how 
host firms resolve the chicken-and-egg problem and asks What are the early-stage 
strategies host firms pursue to create value, recruit initial participants and induce 
participants’ interactions in two-sided marketplaces? 
Prior research has four limitations in the ways in has attempted to answer this 
question. First, it assumes host firms create value by establishing a large network of 
supply-side and demand-side participants, thus lowering participants’ search and 
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transaction costs (Armstrong 2006, Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Evans, 2003; Parker and 
van Alstyne, 2005).  Yet, this type of value is not compelling for initial participants when 
the network is still nascent. Moreover, existing studies focus on established firms 
transitioning into two-sided markets (e.g. Zhu & Iansiti, 2012), or firms that have already 
attracted complementors, and recruited initial participants (e.g. Boudreau & Jeppesen, 
2014; Eisenmann, Parker & van Alstyne, 2011; Rysman, 2007; Vogelsang, 2010). 
Established firms benefit from significant levels of resources, which they can use to 
subsidize participation for both sides. Yet, host firms setting out to build a two-sided 
marketplace do not have a pre-existing customer base they can leverage to populate the 
marketplace (e.g. Altman & Tripsas, 2015); are not yet legitimated (Singh, Tucker & 
House, 1986) as capable intermediaries; and have not yet developed substantial levels of 
valuable resources and capabilities (Brush, Greene, & Hart, 2001). Together, these 
arguments highlight the importance of studying the early-stage strategies that create value 
for initial participants and support the growth of two-sided marketplaces. 
Second, prior research on two-sided marketplaces considers price structures, or 
“the allocation of the total price between the buyer and seller” (Rochet & Tirole, 2006: 
647), as the primary, and often only, recruitment mechanism (Bolt & Tieman, 2008; 
Chen, 2008; Chou et al, 2012; Hagiu, 2006; Weyl, 2010). Initial participants are 
incentivized to join when host firms subsidize participation for the side with the least 
incentive to join, and charge the side with the highest incentive to join the marketplace 
(e.g. Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Hagiu, 2009; Rochet & Tirole, 2003b; 
2006; Weyl, 2010). This transactional view of marketplaces has been criticized for not 
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having considered a more complete set of strategic decisions and processes, which 
acknowledge the role of marketplace participants and their interactions in marketplace 
growth (Gawer, 2014). A few studies have more recently begun to consider how 
participants impact marketplace growth. Tucker and Zhang (2010), for example, tested 
potential sellers’ willingness to join a marketplace based on whether the host firm 
advertised who had already joined the marketplace, i.e. sellers or buyers or both. 
Moreover, Zhu and Iansiti (2012) found that the fit between participants’ consumption 
preferences and the marketplace’s offering strengthens network effects and enhances the 
ability of new entrants to compete in two-sided markets. Lastly, Gawer (2014) has 
theorized about how different types of participants influence the scope and activities of 
the host firm. Yet, no studies have examined whether and how host firms take into 
account different types of marketplace participants or their interactions when building a 
two-sided marketplace.  
Third, studies on two-sided marketplaces are typically based on single cases or 
formal economic models (e.g. Hagiu & Jullien, 2011; Rysman, 2009; Vogelsang, 2010). 
But as Gawer (2014) has suggested “most economic models of two-sided markets…do 
not offer much insight into what determines how or why [marketplaces] would evolve.” 
(1241). Understanding the evolution of two-sided marketplaces begins with 
understanding their early stages.  
Fourth, existing research on two-sided marketplaces has been criticized for 
lacking conceptual murkiness (Thomas, Autio & Gann, 2014). Video game platforms 
(e.g. Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2014; Hagiu & Lee, 2011), credit card payment systems (e.g. 
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Rochet & Tirole, 2003a; Rysman, 2007), operating systems (e.g. Evans, 2003), enterprise 
software (e.g. Wareham, Fox & Giner, 2014), and more recently peer-to-peer rental 
services (e.g. Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015) are all considered two-sided 
marketplaces.  Theoretical and empirical distinctions among all these two-sided firms 
remain unaddressed.  In peer-to-peer marketplaces, for example, the host is not a piece of 
hardware and does not require supply-side participants to create technologically 
compatible products. Yet, we know little about the unique challenges, if any, host firms 
face in the peer-to-peer context.  
Given the lack of empirical evidence and limited theory on the origins of two-
sided marketplaces, I conducted a multi-case inductive study suitable for in-depth study 
of poorly understood phenomena and new theory development (Eisenhardt, 1989). To 
maintain consistency in theoretical case sampling (Miles & Huberman, 1994), I chose 
cases that operated as peer-to-peer marketplaces, which enable interactions between 
individuals and/or independent professionals. Interviews and archival data from ten cases 
generate insights on the process through which host firms create value, recruit initial 
participants and manage their interactions.  
Findings suggest that in the absence of compelling network effects, host firms 
signal to potential participants that they can effectively promote and monitor participants’ 
conformity with appropriate behaviors. Conformity implies predictability in behavior. To 
promote and monitor conformity, host firms exercise different levels of control over their 
marketplace on two dimensions. The first dimension of control is concerned with 
managing participant heterogeneity, primarily on the supply side. The second dimension 
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is concerned with governing cross-side interactions, and more specifically with 
determining the degree to which host firms oversee, referee and influence how, when and 
under what terms the two sides interact. Each level of control (low, average/balanced, or 
high) represents a strategy for promoting conformity. By considering the interaction of 
three levels of control on each of the two dimensions, I find nine types of value-creating 
activities that concurrently exercise control over supply-side participants and over cross-
side interactions. The sequence in which host firms focus their attention and resources on 
each of these activities over time suggests two alternative but “equifinal” paths for 
promoting and monitoring conformity. 
Broadly, the first path involves transitions from low to high levels of control. 
Initially, this path focuses on recruiting as many participants and inducing as many 
interactions as possible. However, low levels of control render the marketplace 
vulnerable to the risks of non-conformity. Over time, host firms exercise higher levels of 
control on either one or both dimensions in their efforts to winnow out non-conforming 
participants. In contrast, the second path begins with balancing low and high levels of 
control on at least one dimension. Balancing activities aim at recruiting relevant 
participants and producing quality matches—often at the expense of rapid large-scale 
growth. Host firms later lessen control on one or both dimensions so as to accelerate the 
growth of the marketplace. These findings suggest that openness to heterogeneous 
participants early on will eventually require more direct oversight over their participation 
so as to ensure conformity. In contrast, restricting heterogeneity early on lessens the need 
for direct firm oversight or involvement in participants’ interactions but eventually 
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requires lessening that control and inviting more heterogeneous participants so as to 
accelerate the growth of the marketplace. 
The two paths provide evidence of alternative processes through which host firms 
promote and monitor participant conformity, and thus create value for initial participants. 
They also cast new light on the tradeoffs between different approaches to designing two-
sided marketplaces. Specifically, the first path begins with an inclusive and hands-off 
approach towards managing participant heterogeneity and governing participant 
interactions, whereas the second one begins with a more exclusive and hands-on 
approach. Initial approaches are modified as host firms gain insights into participant 
behavior and integrate them into their efforts to propagate conformity. Both paths 
leverage initial participants as growth resources, albeit in different ways. The first path 
harnesses the opportunities of participant heterogeneity which contributes to making as 
many matches as possible, whereas the second path harnesses the opportunities of 
homogeneity that leverages shared interests and values and existing trust to make high 
quality matches. 
Findings from this study contribute to research on resource orchestration (Sirmon, 
Hitt, & Ireland, 2007; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland & Gilbert, 2011). The prevailing view in the 
strategy and entrepreneurship literatures advocates resource ownership and control as 
well as internal resource development as the path to value creation and competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Sirmon et al, 2007; 2011). In contrast, this study presents an 
alternative process of resource development, which occurs across firm boundaries in 
collaboration with external stakeholders. These insights are relevant for studying not only 
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two-sided marketplaces but also firms that seek to induce the collaboration and voluntary 
contributions of external actors including independent user communities (Felin & Zenger, 
2014; Shah, 2006), and even firm-hosted user communities (Jeppesen & Frederiksen, 
2006). Lastly, the focus of this study on peer-to-peer marketplaces generates new 
knowledge about a particular type of marketplace that is enabling the growth of the 
increasingly prevalent but under-researched phenomenon of the ‘sharing economy’ 
(Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015; The Economist, 2013). 
Chapter 2 discusses in more detail existing research on firms operating in two-
sided markets and chapter 3 reports on research methods. In chapter 4, I present my 
findings, and finally, in chapter 5, I discuss contributions to theory and practice. I present 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before discussing in depth literature on two-sided marketplaces, I define relevant 
terms and make both theoretical and empirical distinctions between related constructs. 
I. DEFINITIONS 
Two-Sided Marketplaces and Platforms 
In their modern form, two-sided marketplaces are enabled by an underlying 
technology, a ‘platform’, which facilitates direct interactions between supply-side and 
demand-side participants (Thomas et al, 2014). The platform construct has been used 
loosely in existing research to connote a number of different phenomena including 
market intermediaries that allow different actors to exchange products or services directly 
(Rochet & Tirole, 2006) thus alleviating market inefficiencies (Hagiu & Wright, 2014), 
and technical architecture that promotes a family of compatible products around a 
technological core (Robertson & Ulrich, 1998).  
For clarity, I refer to the market intermediary that develops and uses a particular 
technology to facilitate interactions between interdependent actors, and thus create a two-
sided marketplace as the host firm (figure 2.1). I refer to marketplace participants as the 
core participants, i.e. those on the supply side who sell or provide a product/service to 
participants on the demand side who are either buyers/consumers. I also acknowledge 
that different interactions exist: between the host firm and each side (firm-participant 
interactions), between the two sides (cross-side interactions), and among participants 
within the same side (same-side interactions). It is important to note that two-sided 
marketplaces enable cross-side interactions, which include but are not limited to 
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transactions (e.g. payment is a transactional interaction whereas messages exchanged 
between a seller and buyer are a social interaction). A transaction must exist between 
core participants. Host firms that enable only social interactions (e.g. social media 
platforms), or only knowledge exchange (e.g. user communities) but no transactions 
between core participants are not considered in this study to be two-sided marketplaces. 
Lastly, a two-sided marketplace includes the host firm, the core marketplace participants, 
and the transactional and non-transactional interactions that occur between and among 
these actors. The focus of this study is on the decisions and actions of host firms. 
Figure 2.1: Key Actors and Their Interactions in a Two-Sided Marketplace 
 
Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces  
A peer-to-peer marketplace is a type of two-sided marketplace that enables cross-
side interactions between individuals and/or independent professionals as opposed to 
firms. In this context, individual consumers and/or independent professionals may occupy 
either side of the marketplace or both (Hamari, Sjöklint, & Ukkonen, 2015). Prior 
Host Firm 
Same-side interactions Same-side interactions 
Supply-Side Participants  
(e.g. sellers, service providers) 
Demand-Side Participants  




research has theorized that ‘types of participants’ is a relevant dimension for 
distinguishing marketplaces with different structural characteristics (Gawer, 2014). 
Specifically, Gawer (2014) has argued that employees or business-level departments 
participate in internal platforms; assemblers or suppliers participate in supply-chain 
platforms; and complementors participate in industry platforms. In this study, individuals 
independent of the firm participate in peer-to-peer marketplaces. Moreover, existing 
research has studied primarily business-to-consumer and business-to-business 
marketplaces in which supply side participants have to produce products or services that 
are technologically compatible with the underlying platform technology. In peer-to-peer 
marketplaces, however, participants are individual consumers who do not necessarily 
adhere to particular standards of service, quality or behavior. Even though heterogeneity 
in consumption preferences is a key challenge in any market with network externalities 
(Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Simcoe, 2012; Waguespack & Fleming, 2009), in the peer-to-
peer context, it is an even more acute challenge because it exists not only the demand-
side but also on the supply-side.  
Peer-to-peer marketplaces are not only empirically but also theoretically 
interesting. The peer-to-peer context presents opportunities to study different types of 
exchanges such as asset rental services (e.g. Airbnb, HomeAway), knowledge exchange 
services (e.g. Avvo), task-based services (e.g. Dogvacay), and asset ownership transfer 
(e.g. Etsy). The basis of exchange may influence the activities that a marketplace pursues 
and relatedly, the process of value creation. Table 2.1 seeks to elucidate distinctions 
between peer-to-peer marketplaces and the most commonly studied business-to-consumer 
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and business-to-business marketplaces by presenting three distinct categories of 
marketplaces. In the methods chapter, I build on these categories to construct a 
theoretically relevant sample of cases. 
Next, I draw from the platform economics literature to review prior research on 
two-sided marketplaces. 
II. PLATFORM ECONOMICS RESEARCH 
Platform economics has its roots in network economics but has evolved as a 
distinct literature that researches technology-enabled market intermediaries, which 
coordinate a system of interactions among two or more groups of interdependent 
participants, and capture value from their interactions (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and 
Jullien 2003; Evans, 2003; Parker and van Alstyne 2005, Rochet and Tirole 2003b; 
2006).  This research studies the actions of technology platform owners, i.e. host firms or 
intermediaries, and those of complementors, i.e. supply-side participants (e.g. Boudreau 
& Jeppesen, 2014; Gawer & Henderson, 2007). Interdependencies between 
complementors and consumers imply the presence of indirect network externalities. 
Indirect network externalities exist when demand for a product or service depends on the 
number of both participating consumers and producers. In contrast, direct network 
externalities exist when demand depends only on the number of other consumers in the 
network (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 1999). Interdependency 
between the actions of consumers and suppliers in two-sided marketplaces exacerbates 
the early-stage challenge of recruiting initial participants because the growth of the 
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Table 2.1: Distinctions Between Peer-To-Peer Marketplaces and Other Two-Sided Marketplaces  
DIMENSIONS CONSTITUTIVE 
ELEMENTS 
CATEGORIES OF PEER-TO-PEER 
MARKETPLACES 



















   ü ü ü 
Individuals / independent 
professionals 
 
ü ü ü ü ü ü 
        
Types of 
Outcomes 
Ownership rights transfer 
  
ü   ü   
Task or knowledge-based 
service 
  
 ü   ü  
Asset-based service (e.g. 
rental) 
  ü   ü 




















supply-side depends not only on the size of the supply side but also the size of the 
demand side. 
By virtue of brokering interactions between two sides, host firms were thought to 
interfere with transacting parties’ bargaining process and thus create monopolies on at 
least one side of the market (Evans, 2003; U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation, 2001). 
Unsurprisingly, the market interference mechanism that has received the greatest 
scholarly interest is price structures, which refer to “the allocation of the total price 
between the buyer and seller” (Rochet & Tirole, 2006: 647) whereas total price is the 
amount charged to both sides. The key insight emerging from this literature is that the 
way host firms allocate the cost of participation between the two sides concurrently 
influences the willingness of each side to join and transact within the marketplace 
(Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Hagiu, 2009; Rochet & Tirole, 2003b; 2006; 
Weyl, 2010), and ultimately “profits and economic efficiency as well” (Rochet & Tirole, 
2006: 648). Over time, however, scholars have focused less on studying the monopolistic 
behaviors of host firms and more on the role of price structures in resolving “the 
celebrated chicken-and-egg problem” of recruiting two or more distinct yet 
interdependent sides of the market (Rochet & Tirole, 2003b: 990). 
Existing research has argued that setting appropriate price structures involves 
subsidization on at least one side of the marketplace. In other words, host firms charge 
the side of the marketplace that stands to benefit the most (or derive the most utility) from 
its participation, and not charge at all the side that stands to benefit the least (Bolt & 
Tieman, 2008; Chen, 2008; Hagiu, 2006; Weyl, 2010). An underlying assumption in this 
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research is that subsidizing participation is an adequate recruitment incentive for initial 
participants (Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2006; 2009; Rochet & Tirole, 2002; Rysman, 
2009; Sun & Tse, 2007; Weyl, 2010). 
Even though theories of pricing strategies provide a parsimonious theory for how 
firms in two-sided markets might resolve the chicken-and-egg problem, the assumption 
that transactional efficiencies and subsidization provide a large enough incentive for the 
two sides to come onboard remains unquestioned. Lowering participants’ search and 
transaction costs (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Evans, 2003; Parker and 
van Alstyne 2005; Rochet and Tirole 2003b; 2006) is only one aspect of value host firms 
create for marketplace participants. Moreover, this type of value is only possible if the 
network of participants is large enough. Yet, these long-held assumptions have been 
called into question with more recent work that theorizes some intermediaries 
purposefully increase participants’ search costs by diverting users towards higher profit 
options (sellers, or stores) instead of making the most efficient match between buyers and 
sellers (Hagiu & Jullien, 2011). Their argument raises the question of what other types of 
mechanisms, above and beyond making transactions more efficient, host firms pursue to 
create value. Moreover, assuming subsidies are an adequate recruitment mechanism 
overlooks a whole host of other activities that firms might pursue in conjunction with 
subsidization.  
Prior literature has also neglected to examine systematically the role of different 
participants in marketplace strategy. Participants and their preferences present a critical 
challenge for all networked firms trying to achieve demand economies of scale (Gupta et 
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al, 1999) such as when diffusing technological standards (Simcoe, 2012; Waguespack & 
Fleming, 2009). In two-sided markets, participant preferences have also been 
acknowledged to influence the strength of indirect network effects (Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). 
More specifically, Zhu and Iansiti (2012) have shown that demand heterogeneity, defined 
as the variance in consumer preferences, impacts the ‘quality’ of the customer base, i.e. 
the strength of the match between a consumer’s preference and the focal firm’s offering. 
In turn, a high quality customer base increased the likelihood an entrant successfully 
competed with incumbents for the same customer segment. Relatedly, Parker and van 
Alstyne (2005) have suggested that rather than viewing heterogeneity in participant 
preferences as a challenge, host firms might leverage it as an opportunity to match 
products or services to heterogeneous consumer preferences, thus capturing greater value. 
Additionally, Gawer (2014) has suggested that host firms with different scope and 
different activities have different types of participants. Taken together, these studies point 
to the important, but under-theorized and under-researched, role participants may play in 
marketplace strategy.  
Lastly, existing research on two-sided marketplaces is based on formal economic 
models that estimate the number of participants or the volume of transactions as a 
function of participants’ utility, cost of participation, and multi-homing options (Caillaud 
& Jullien, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). But “most economic models of two-sided 
markets…do not offer much insight into what determines how or why [marketplaces] 
would evolve.” (Gawer, 2014: 1241). Less frequently, scholars use illustrative examples 
or draw from single cases of well-established firms. Established firms have already 
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validated and refined their technology, developed partnering capabilities, and recruited a 
critical mass of participants (e.g. Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2014; Eisenmann et al, 2011; 
Rysman 2007; Vogelsang, 2010). Similarly, product firms transitioning from ‘one-sided’ 
to two-sided models leverage existing customers and partners to populate a two-sided 
marketplace (Altman & Tripsas, 2015). These empirical settings are fit for understanding 
how firms with access to abundant resources, including customers, can strengthen 
network effects. They are not necessarily relevant to early-stage host firms setting out to 
build a marketplace from scratch without significant levels of resources, legitimacy, or 
pre-existing customers. An additional limitation of prior research lies in the liberal use of 
the platform construct (Thomas et al, 2014). Product platforms, marketplaces, industry 
ecosystems and peer-to-peer marketplaces are assumed to be part of the same category 
and driven by the same activities. With the exception of Thomas et al’s (2014) 
categorization of the platform literature into different streams, and Gawer’s (2014) 
theorizing around platforms with different structures and scopes, research on platforms 
still lacks conceptual clarity.  
This study builds on prior research on two-sided marketplaces and addresses the 
aforementioned oversights by exploring the early-stage value creation process in ten 
peer-to-peer marketplaces, a particular type of two-sided marketplace. Inductive inquiry 
facilitates the development of new theory on early-stage strategies in two-sided 
marketplaces. 
Summary. In their modern form, two-sided marketplaces use technology, or a 
‘platform’, to facilitate direct interactions—including but not limited to transactions—
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between supply-side and demand-side participants. Existing research on two-sided 
marketplaces has focused primarily on price structures to argue that subsidization is an 
adequate recruitment mechanism, and on well-established host firms, which either have 
pre-existing customers or abundant resources to subsidize early-stage participation for 
both sides. This work presents an incomplete view of how specifically host firms create 
value and recruit initial participants in the absence of a critical mass of other participants. 
Scholars have more recently highlighted the importance of studying other aspects of 
marketplace strategy and using more diverse methods so as to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the evolution of two-sided marketplaces. Through this study, I address 
these limitations and ask What are the early-stage strategies host firms pursue to create 




CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
I. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Given limited theory and evidence on the origins of two-sided marketplaces and 
in particular, the strategies that host firms pursue to recruit initial marketplace 
participants, I carried out an inductive multi-case study suitable for building new theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). Inductive inquiry takes a critical stance towards 
assumptions in existing research, thereby creating opportunities to identify theoretically 
relevant concepts that cannot be specified a priori (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). Multiple cases allow for comparative analysis and for confirming or 
disconfirming patterns across cases, thus facilitating the development of more 
generalizable and robust theory “more deeply grounded in varied empirical evidence” 
than theory developed from single cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 27).  
 I first collected observational data and pilot interview data on host firms in the 
process of building two-sided marketplaces. Using the categories of marketplaces in table 
2.1, I collected pilot data from host firms building ‘asset transfer’, ‘traditional services’ or 
‘asset rental’ marketplaces in both the peer-to-peer, or business-to-consumer/business-to-
business context. This sampling approach strengthened external validity (Cook & 
Campbell, 1976). 
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II. DATA AND DATA COLLECTION 
Pilot Data 
Theory building from cases draws from theoretical sampling as opposed to 
random sampling that allows observation of the phenomenon of interest (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). As is typical of theory-building research based on qualitative data, 
theoretical sampling is often guided by findings from pilot data analysis that elucidates 
important aspects of the phenomenon (Suddaby, 2006). Pilot data were first collected 
through observations of three conference sessions during the South by Southwest 
Interactive conference in Austin, Texas in 2013 and 2014 (table 3.1). The Interactive 
portion of the South by Southwest conference focuses on various aspects of technology 
firms and particularly start-ups. Presenters in the observed sessions included founders and 
other senior members of firms building peer-to-peer marketplaces. A small number of 
two-sided firms that did not mediate a transaction are labeled ‘other two-sided’ in tables 
3.1 and 3.2. Following these observations, I also carried out twenty pilot interviews with 
sixteen two-sided marketplaces in 2014 and 2015 (table 3.2). 
The goals of the pilot study were to gain insight into early-stage actions of host 
firms that would guide subsequent case sampling, and construct a semi-structured 
interview questionnaire (in appendix).  
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PARTICIPANT ROLES INFORMANTS CATEGORY 
Lyft SxSW Interactive 2013 – 
“The Future of 
Transportation”  
Drivers and passengers Founder P2P Services 
Wheelz Drivers and passengers Founder P2P Services 
Etsy SxSW Interactive 2014 – 
“Nanosize Me: The 
Currency of Sharing” 
Sellers and buyers of handmade crafts Policy Director P2P asset transfer 
Feastly Chefs and guests Founder P2P services 
HomeAway Home owners and renters VP of Strategy P2P asset rental 
ThreadUP Sellers and buyers of used clothing Chief Marketing Officer P2P asset transfer 




Home owners and renters Head of Community Development P2P asset rental 
Kickstarter Individual investors and entrepreneurs Community Strategist B2C services 
Soundcloud Musicians and consumers Community Evangelist Other two-sided 
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Table 3.2: Pilot Data Collected - Interviews 
HOST FIRM 
(PSEUDONYM) 
PARTICIPANT ROLES INFORMANTS # OF 
I/VIEWS 
CATEGORY 
ABTesters Web developers and businesses  Co-founder/CEO 1 B2C services  
BlogMarketing Bloggers and retailers Founder/CEO 1 B2C services  
CoachAccess Sports coaches and consumers Founder/CEO 2 P2P services 
CivilSolutions Individuals and non-profits Founder/CEO 2 Other two-sided 
DentalTalent Dentists and dental hygienists Co-founders (2) 1 B2C services  
EngineTalent Hardware engineers and businesses Co-founders (2) 3 B2B services  
Ensure Insurance brokers and underwriters UX Designer 1 B2B services  
U-Fix-It Home material retailers and homeowners Founder 1 B2C asset transfer 
MagDiscover Publishers and readers Founder/CEO 1 B2C services 
Marina Rentals Marinas owners and charter businesses Chief Operating Officer 1 B2C services 
Off The Path Locals and travelers Founder/CEO 1 Other two-sided 
Office Space Real estate owners and businesses VP of Business Development 1 B2B asset rental 
E-Coupons Retailers and consumers Head of Strategy 1 B2C services 
StayTogether Home owners and travelers Product Marketing Manager 1 P2P asset rental 
TravelAnywhere Home owners and travelers Community Team Manager 1 P2P asset rental 
ToolAddicts Tool owners and renters Founder 1 P2P asset rental 
Total   20  
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Case Data 
Theoretical Sampling. Case data were collected on host firms building peer-to-
peer marketplaces. Cases were selected so that each category of marketplace (asset rental, 
traditional services, and asset rental services) was represented in the sample at least 
twice. This theoretical sampling approach sought to maintain consistency in how cases 
were selected (Miles & Huberman, 1994), thus addressing inconsistent sampling 
approaches in prior studies of two-sided marketplaces. By sampling across different 
categories of marketplaces, I also wanted to ensure that a more complete set of actions 
would be observable. Case sampling also took into account the stage of the marketplace. 
Cases were included only if they were still in the process of generating significant 
network effects. This characteristic was first identified independently based on when the 
host firm had launched. The extent to which these firms were still trying “to make it” was 
confirmed in the first interview. By capturing cases before they had generated large-scale 
network effects, I reduced informants’ retrospective bias by capturing their accounts as 
close to the launch as possible. Repeated interviews carried over time complement 
retrospective accounts and captured informants’ thoughts, decisions and actions as they 
unfolded. 
Data sources. Data were collected from five sources: 1) semi-structured 
interviews with founders, their teams, and whenever possible their advisors and investors, 
2) publicly available archival data including websites, social media feeds, and blogs; 3) 
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company archives; 4) informal follow ups through emails; and 5) observations of two 
founder meet-up events which several cases in my sample sampled attended. 
The primary sources of data were semi-structured interviews with founders, co-
founders, founding team members and other key decisions makers such as board 
members and investors. To capture the evolution of strategy, I carried out interviews 
every six to eight weeks. Longitudinal interviews allowed for following up with 
informants’ prior statements about future plans and open-ended items, thereby 
minimizing recollection bias. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 summarize the interview, archival and 
observational data collected. My final case sample included ten start-ups and forty-three 
interviews for a total of fifty-eight recorded hours. All interviews were recorded with 
participants’ consent and transcribed into text. Company and informant names have been 
masked to protect informants’ identity. 
On average, interviews ranged between half hour and two and a half hours. The 
average interview duration was seventy-five minutes. Interviews were semi-structured, 
i.e. general interview questions initiated the conversation but allowed informants to focus 
on issues most salient to them. Follow up questions sought elaboration, clarification and 
in-depth discussion of frequently discussed issues and challenges. Initial interviews 
focused on the founders’ motivation for founding, milestones achieved or missed, and 
initial challenges including website launch, founding team composition, first participants, 
funding milestones, and technology evolution.  
Prior to the first interview, I familiarized myself with the marketplace registering 
as a participant and initiating a transaction. I then noted my observations of technological
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# OF I/VIEW 
HOURS 
ALL ABOARD P2P asset rental: 
boat rental 
Boat owners and boat 
renters 
03/2015 08/2015 Founder 2 3.5 
BUOYANT  P2P asset rental: 
boat rental 
Boat owners and boat 
renters 
03/2013 07/2015 Dir. of Business Development 3 1.5 
GEAR UP 
 
P2P asset transfer: 
triathlon gear  
Triathlon gear sellers 
and buyers 
08/2014 06/2014 Founder, Board Member, 
Product Manager, Community 
Outreach Manager, Developer 
8 8 
GRASSHOPPERS P2P services: lawn 
care 
Lawn care professionals 
and home owners 
03/2014 08/2015 Founder 6 12 
HUNTLERZ P2P services: 
hunting leasing 
Land owners/hunting trip 
outfitters and hunters 
10/2012 08/2015 Founder, Co-Founder 4 6 






12/2014 08/2015 Founder 3 5.5 
PI SOCIETY P2P services: math 
tutoring 
Math tutors and students 08/2013 08/2015 Founder 4 5.5 
PRINT-IN-3D P2P services: 3D 
printing 
3D printer owners and 
consumers 
02/2013 07/2015 Founder 2 2.5 
SHIP-N-GO P2P services: 
shipping 
Drivers and shippers 02/2014 03/2015 Founder, Investors, Advisor  7 9 
SPOKES P2P asset rental: 
bike rental 
Bike owners and renters 04/2013 07/2015 Chief Marketing Officer, 
Marketing Manager 
4 4.5 
Total 43 58 
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ALL ABOARD - - 19 15 3 40 168 Mobile app designs, recruitment emails (23) 
BUOYANT  3 7 154 - - 99 2456  
GEAR UP - 10 2 2 2 69 3187 Biz plan (1), event photo (1), blog posts (8), meeting observation (1) 
GRASSHOPPERS - - - 1 4 4 - Marketing collateral, meeting observation (1) 
HUNTLERZ - 3 - - 2 70 200 Lead generation test archive, meeting observation (1) 
MATERIALZ  - - - - 1 14 103 Mobile app designs 
PI SOCIETY - - 4 1 - 17 1922 Video content (100), magazine (1), List of speaking engagements 
PRINT-IN-3D - - 15 - - 157 135 ‘Community’ forum archive, meeting observation (1) 
SHIP-N-GO 23 - 4 - - 168 406 Blog posts (207), e-book (1), participant conversations (2866), meeting observation (1) 
SPOKES 15 - 11 - - 258 2364 
Media interviews (2), company survey report (1), 
participant conversations (12908), meeting 
observation (1) 
Total 41 20 209 19 12 896 10,941  
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features, pricing and terms of service and used those notes to ask informants questions 
about the evolution of different aspects of the marketplace. During interviews, I first 
explained to informants my interest in understanding specific actions and decisions they 
had taken to grow the marketplace. Subsequently, I asked them to describe their 
motivation for founding and the evolution of their business from idea inception to the 
time of the interview. During this process, I guided them through a chronological 
sequence of events, capturing milestones, dates, facts, and contributors. I also asked 
informants to discuss specific actions that helped or hindered the growth of the 
marketplace, and noted plans to change, test, or pursue particular paths in the future. I 
followed up on the progress of these plans and other open-ended items in subsequent 
interviews, noting actions taken or not taken, new information, and lessons learned. This 
approach allowed me to track growth issues and capture key activities and actions as they 
unfolded over time. I also tracked the evolution of resources including team members, 
number of participants on each side of the marketplace, funding, and revenue numbers. 
However, not all cases were willing to disclose this information. Lastly, I sought 
clarification on industry-specific or technical terms with which I lacked familiarity. As I 
carried out new rounds of interviews, I checked my own understanding of prior events, 
and garnered informants’ reactions to themes that emerged from each of my analyses.  
Informants’ accounts were corroborated through a variety of archival data and in a 
few instances, with observations of meetings and meet-up events among several of the 
founders. Most archival data were publicly available such as website archives, company 
and founder blogs, social media accounts, press releases, email newsletters, investment 
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platform company profiles such as AngelList and CrunchBase, and founders’ LinkedIn 
profiles. In three cases, I was able to obtain company archives of marketing and customer 
service emails (All Aboard case), as well as archives of messages exchanged between 
supply-side and demand-side participants (Ship-N-Go and Spokes cases).  Internal 
company archives were particularly useful in corroborating informants’ accounts. 
III. DATA ANALYSIS 
Developing new theory requires intimate knowledge of the data and iterative 
comparisons between emerging patterns and existing research (Glaser & Strauss 1967). 
In this process, researchers take a critical stance towards a priori assumptions in existing 
research and seek to identify new, theoretically relevant concepts that cannot be specified 
a priori, eventually generating propositions about connections between concepts 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
Following this approach, I began my analysis writing case histories using 
interview data first and triangulating informants’ accounts with archival data whenever 
possible (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). I also verified facts with founders and checked 
my understanding of events as I carried out repeated rounds of interviews. To facilitate 
subsequent case comparisons, I organized case histories in the following sections: a) 
offering, value proposition and vision; b) launch, prototype and early milestones; c) 
technology evolution; d) geographic focus; e) resource evolution (incubation, funding, 
team members, revenue); f) initial participants participant growth; g) pricing structure; h) 
growth/progress metrics; i) community; j) insurance, certification, trust; k) 
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partners/acquirers. Some of these sections were identified at the onset of analysis whereas 
others emerged from recurring topics discussed during interviews.  
I began to construct the case chronologies and identify emergent themes while I 
was collecting data. I summarized key observations and noted repeated themes for each 
case. This approach allowed me to identify early themes that merited more discussion and 
in-depth exploration in subsequent interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989). After completing all 
case histories, I created a visual representation of the evolution of each marketplace, 
noting specific actions, and their connections to recruiting or managing a particular side 
(i.e. supply or demand or both). This mapping also allowed me to identify shifts in 
attention on specific participants or sides of the marketplaces. Emerging from this 
analysis was the observation that firms focused attention first on recruiting the supply 
rather than the demand side, and on governing how interactions occurred. 
Next, I carried out cross-case analyses looking for similarities in concepts and 
themes across cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). I paid particular attention to 
challenges, whether and how these challenges were overcome, the learning that emerged 
from this process, the problems that remained unresolved and the plans to solve these 
problems in the future. In doing so, I went back to the text, assigning codes to sections of 
text using terms that remained true to the informants’ use of language towards more 
abstract codes until the majority of observations were classified into theoretically relevant 
categories, or themes (Boyatzis, 1998; Headland, Pike, & Harris, 1990). Tables with 
quotes corresponding to each theme facilitated the comparison of themes across cases 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Cross-case comparisons revealed two dimensions of the 
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marketplaces host firms tried to control as well as a number of related activities. Once I 
gathered all supporting evidence, I arrived at a clear conceptual definition of two 
dimensions of control, and nine key activities. I then carried out another round of analysis 
using a process lens “that explicitly incorporates temporal progressions of activities as 
elements of explanation and understanding” (Langley, Smallman & Tsoukas, 2013: 1). In 
doing so, I discovered host firms were clustered in two groups within which they 
exhibited similarities but across which they differed. Each cluster of firms pursued an 
alternative but “equifinal” path for promoting and monitoring conformity, ultimately 
creating value, recruiting initial participants and growing their marketplaces. I discuss 
these findings next. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
As previously discussed, prior research has not adequately explained how host 
firms create value and recruit early-stage participants in two-sided markets (e.g. 
Armstrong 2006; Eisenmann et al, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2003b; 2006). Previously 
identified strategies assume transactional efficiencies are the primary source of value for 
initial participants, and subsidizing the cost of participation is an adequate recruitment 
mechanism (e.g. Bolt & Tieman, 2008; Hagiu, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Sun & Tse, 
2007). This transactional view of marketplaces provides an incomplete picture of early-
stage strategies that help to recruit initial participants and coordinate their interactions in 
two-sided marketplaces. Moreover, the focus on pricing as well the use of formal 
economic models has produced little theory or systematic evidence of how specifically 
participants are considered in marketplace strategy (Gawer, 2014). To address these 
limitations, I carried out an inductive study of early-stage strategies in ten peer-to-peer 
marketplaces—a particular type of firm operating in two-sided markets.  
Findings from this study are consistent with the claim of prior research that host 
firms set prices in such way that one side’s cost of participation is subsidized (e.g. Bolt & 
Tieman, 2008; Chen, 2008; Hagiu, 2006; Weyl, 2010). Host firms in this study charged 
one side of the marketplace a transaction or membership fee, and the other side no or 
lower fees (table 4.1). Moreover, all cases except Pi Society, which postponed any fees 
until a future date, charged their members fees since the very first transaction. All cases 
except HuntlerZ maintained the same price levels and structures from the time they 
launched their beta site to the end of this study’s observation period. In other words, the 
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presence of any fees charged for participants at launch in the absence of a critical mass of 
participants does not explain why host firms were able to not only recruit initial 
participants but also capture value from the very first transaction. Once again, the 
question emerged about how host firms created value and convinced initial participants to 
join a nascent marketplace. 
In the context of peer-to-peer marketplaces, the early-stage value creation entailed 
host firms signaling to potential participants that conformity would prevail and the risks  
Table 4.1: Price Structures 
CASE TYPE OF FEE SUPPLY-SIDE FEES DEMAND-SIDE FEES 
ALL ABOARD Transaction 10% - 
BUOYANT Transaction 
35% with company 
insurance or 
5% with own insurance 
10% 
SHIP-N-GO Transaction - 6.76% - 15.04% or minimum fee of $45 
MATERIALZ Transaction 10% - 
HUNTLERZ Membership - $30/month or $150/year 
PRINT-IN-3D Transaction - 20% 
PI SOCIETY N/A - - 
GRASSHOPPERS Transaction - $21.99/yard 
GEAR UP Transaction 7% - 
SPOKES Transaction 17.50% 12.50% 
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of non-conformity would be managed. When coordinating interactions among individuals 
who would not necessarily adhere to particular standards of quality, and possess relevant 
knowledge or experience, host firms faced the challenge of ensuring that the behaviors 
participants exhibited in the marketplace aligned with host firm expectations of behaviors 
that would create value for other participants. In turn, conformity would lessen the risk of 
participation for new participants. As a result, host firms had to find ways to signal to 
potential participants that behavioral conformity would be sufficiently promoted and 
monitored. 
To promote and monitor conformity, host firms focused their attention and 
resources on managing two aspects of their marketplace: a) initial participants’ 
heterogeneity based on their knowledge, skills, asset ownership as well as personal values 
and interests; and b) cross-side interactions including, but not limited to, transactions. 
Managing heterogeneity of participants on either side of the marketplace entailed 
decisions about who should be recruited and how. Early-stage efforts were primarily 
focused on managing supply heterogeneity. Managing cross-side interactions entailed 
decisions about how interactions should be structured, influenced and refereed so that 
transactions and information exchange between the two sides were more likely to occur. 
In governing cross-side interactions, host firms determined their level of involvement in 
how how, when, and under what conditions participants interacted.  
Managing participant heterogeneity and governing cross-side interactions were 
two distinct dimensions of control for promoting and monitoring participants’ conformity 
with appropriate behaviors. In the next section of this chapter, I consider the implications 
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of participants’ behavioral conformity for early-stage value creation. In section II, I 
discuss in more detail the two aforementioned dimensions of control. In section III, I 
induce a typology of activities, or processes, that emerge from considering the concurrent 
use of both types of control. Lastly, in section IV, I take a dynamic perspective and 
present how each case pursued these activities over time. Temporal patterns reveal two 
alternative paths host firms pursued to create value for initial participants in the absence 
of large-scale network effects.   
I. VALUE CREATION AND PARTICIPANT CONFORMITY 
Findings suggest that ensuring participant conformity with expected behaviors 
was a critical challenge host firms had to resolve so as to convince initial participants to 
join the marketplace. A founder of several two-sided marketplaces, and board member at 
Gear Up, a marketplace for buying and selling pre-owned triathlon gear, explained how 
this challenge had implications for scaling a peer-to-peer marketplace. 
“The most fundable businesses are B-to-B because the unknown of humankind is somewhat 
solved if you can say “there's a market that meets certain levels of criteria and I've gotten in a 
small segment of those”. You have validated something that is measurable to a degree that I 
understand how it could grow. Peer-to-peer, the fickleness of humans, is a more challenging 
model, but it's also exponentially more scalable and therefore more valuable if you can prove it.” 
(Gear Up Board Member, personal interview, August 2015) 
 
This study focused on peer-to-peer marketplaces precisely because it became evident 
from pilot data analysis that peer-to-peer marketplaces faced the challenge of managing 
the “fickleness of humans” or the lack of predictability that emerged from coordinating 
and managing large numbers of individuals on both sides of the marketplace. I 
In contrast to business-to-consumer or business-to-business marketplaces that 
involve a piece of hardware or software and supply participants conform to technical 
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requirements (e.g. software developed by complementors is made compatible with a 
Kindle or an iOS device), in peer-to-peer marketplaces, conformity was behavioral. 
Conformity appeared as completing profiles, providing detailed product/service 
descriptions, valid payment and contact information, and treating others with care. Non-
conforming behavior took the form of transacting parties defrauding one another; 
transactions initiated but completed outside the marketplace; lack of responsiveness to 
questions; lack of punctuality or friendliness when delivering a service; use of 
inappropriate language when communicating; or simply incomplete profiles. Table 4.2 
summarizes how participant conformity and non-conformity appeared in the data. The 
key insight emerging from the table below is that behavioral conformity related to the 
transaction (e.g. payment information and product description) as well as to the 
transacting parties’ identity and behavior (e.g. friendliness, and language use) 
Table 4.2: Instantiations of Conformity and Non-Conformity  
CONFORMITY NON-CONFORMITY 
Complete profiles Incomplete profiles 
Detailed product/service descriptions Vague product/service descriptions 
Valid contact and payment information Fraudulent contact and payment information 
Transactions completed in the marketplace Transactions initiated but completed outside 
the marketplace 
Responsive to questions Unresponsive to questions 
Punctual, reliable No-show, tardy 
Friendly, social Unfriendly, transactional 
Use of appropriate language Use of inappropriate language 
 
High levels of heterogeneity implied high variance in participant behavior, which 
in turn impeded predictability of participant behavior. Despite its detrimental effects to 
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both participants and host firms, high levels of heterogeneity were not always avoided. In 
fact, heterogeneity and the likelihood of non-conformity was perceived useful in 
garnering information about how to further promote conformity and create value. 
Specifically, divergence from expected behaviors allowed host firms to gain insight into 
participant behavior and fine-tune particular aspects of the marketplace (e.g. information 
and many flow management functionality) so as to induce participation. The founder of 
HuntlerZ, a hunting marketplace connecting landowners and hunting trip outfitters with 
individuals hunting on private land, made decisions on technology that would increase 
participation despite those decisions not adhering to best practices or the most cutting 
edge technological standards. Promoting conformity in the HuntlerZ case was concerned 
with requiring participants to conform to behaviors that did not depart significantly from 
their existing levels of comfort with technology. 
“Things that are today's standards, or cutting edge, in terms of user experience, we don't always 
necessarily adopt. Let's say on mobile, my team wanted to use a “hamburger” menu. It's the little 3 
lines on a mobile platform that most tech savvy users know that that's how you get to pull out the 
menu. Whereas I would say our audience is not as web savvy. They don't know what that button 
does so we try to be 2 years ago in terms of web UX. Instead of having a “hamburger” menu with 
3 lines, it will just say "menu" or "find a hunt" or "post a hunt." (HuntlerZ founder, personal 
interview, August 2015). 
 
Similarly, the founder of Print-In-3D, a marketplace connecting 3D printer 
owners with individuals looking to print 3D parts explained that the insights Print-In-3D 
had gained over time about the needs of its early participants helped introduce changes 
that facilitated the firm’s growth. Implied in the quote below is Print-In-3D’s efforts to 
promote conformity on the supply side by taking control over certain aspects of the 
interaction between the two sides and making outcomes more predictable for the demand 
side. 
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“What we found is that people just wanted a 3D printed part. They didn't care about all the 
different service offerings. They didn't care about who it was that was building it. They had a very 
singular need, and so all this superfluous steps and options out there were just decreasing our 
conversion rate and our cut. By bringing that all into one, basically one step, we are able to have a 
profound impact on our conversion rate and also take a larger percentage of the order.” (Print-In-
3D founder, personal interview, December 2015) 
 
Although promoting and monitoring conformity was a critical aspect of value 
creation for all cases, some host firms began to promote and monitor it more strictly than 
others. Regardless of which approach host firms adopted early on, promoting and 
monitoring conformity appeared to be a capability host firms developed over time as they 
learned how different types of control facilitated or impeded conformity.  
II. DIMENSIONS OF CONTROL FOR PROMOTING AND MONITORING BEHAVIORAL 
CONFORMITY 
As already discussed, the value creation process in early-stage two-sided 
marketplaces was concerned with signaling to potential participants that host firms could 
ensure participants’ behavioral conformity with appropriate behaviors. Doing so involved 
balancing the needs of the host firm for consistent and appropriate behaviors with 
participants’ pre-existing behaviors. This balancing act ultimately sought to minimize 
initial participants’ effort to join and transact within a marketplace and required 
exercising different levels of control on two dimensions: a) participant heterogeneity, 
primarily on the supply side and b) cross-side interactions. Managing participant 
heterogeneity sough to control to different degrees the types of participants allowed or 
invited into the marketplace early on, whereas governing cross-side interactions sought to 
determine the degree to which host firms oversaw, refereed or influenced whether, and 
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under what terms the two-sides interacted. In using these two forms of control, host firms 
invited or restricted, and rewarded or penalized particular behaviors.  
Next, I provide more evidence for these two forms of control. In section III of this 
chapter, I consider their interactions as well as their implications for early-stage value 
creation. Together, these findings begin to answer the question of how host firms 
building two-sided marketplaces create value for initial participants in the absence of a 
large number of other participants. 
Control Dimension #1: Managing Participant Heterogeneity 
The first dimension of control was concerned with managing participant 
heterogeneity defined as the variance in marketplace participants’ preferences, 
knowledge, skills, asset ownership as well as personal values and interests. Consistent 
with the idea that a network is valuable when it is expansive, founders and their teams 
believed that managing large numbers of heterogeneous participants would be critical in 
the success of their firms. These assumptions were articulated in terms of a long-term 
vision, which considered a future version of the marketplace as one that included 
participants not currently engaged in, but likely to adopt, the behaviors promoted by the 
marketplace once network effects were set in motion. In other words, success was 
perceived to be the function of facilitating interactions among a large number of 
heterogeneous participants. For example, the founder of Gear Up, a marketplace where 
individuals could sell and purchase pre-owned triathlon gear, wanted to “get more people 
outdoors” and expand access to sports for individuals that never had the opportunity or 
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the financial means to pursue them by giving them alternative and more cost effective 
ways to own the appropriate gear. 
“I think sports are a fundamental human right, it touches a very primal instinct, to be active, to 
push ourselves, to use our physiology. I think what's really sad is how many great athletes never 
find out that they were truly good at a sport, or born to play it because they never could afford to 
play it in the first place. It's really expensive to get into serious cycling and triathlon, and even 
outdoor adventure sports, whether it's camping, hunting, or fishing; they're pretty expensive. We're 
looking at ways that we can get people outdoors, into a much more reasonable price point.” (Gear 
Up founder, personal interview, June 2014) 
 
Despite their plans to propagate particular behaviors to new and heterogeneous 
populations, in the early stages, host firms exhibited different levels of openness towards 
initial participants, that is, they exercised different levels of control over who could 
initially join and transact through the marketplace. Control over participant heterogeneity 
also varied on each side of the marketplace. In most cases, host firms were more 
concerned about managing supply-side participant heterogeneity (henceforth supply 
heterogeneity) than they were about managing demand-side participant heterogeneity 
(henceforth demand heterogeneity). The lack of intentional management of demand 
heterogeneity early on was common across all cases. However, host firms exhibited 
greater variance in how they managed supply heterogeneity. In some cases, they invited 
anyone willing to participate regardless of their likelihood to conform to appropriate 
behaviors. In other cases, they limited participation to likely-to-conform, and thus more 
‘relevant’ supply participants. Below, I discuss in more detail host firms’ arms-length 
approach to managing demand heterogeneity and the different ways in which they 
managed supply heterogeneity. 
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Managing demand-side heterogeneity 
Participant heterogeneity refers to the variance in individual preferences and 
behaviors. Prior research on two-sided marketplaces has hinted at the importance of 
demand-side heterogeneity in marketplace strategy (e.g. Zhu and Iansiti, 2012) but has 
not systematically studied whether and how host firms might intentionally manage it 
when building a marketplace. In this study, host firms did not typically restrict or manage 
demand heterogeneity but invited and allowed as many buyers/consumers as there were 
willing to participate (the case of GrassHoppers was the only case intentionally managing 
demand heterogeneity and discussed in section III of this chapter under ‘regulating’ 
activities). I refer to low levels of control over demand heterogeneity as strategies for 
leveraging demand heterogeneity. ‘Leveraging’ implies that host firms viewed 
heterogeneity as an opportunity to gain access not only to as many consumers as possible 
but also to consumers with diverse preferences and characteristics and in turn, to make 
numerous matches. The founder of HuntlerZ explained the value it created for supply-
side participants by leveraging demand side heterogeneity: 
“What we do is we basically...say to land owners, “We can broaden your market, which opens up 
to higher margins potentially. We can do it more effectively than you can because we know how 
to market online, and we know how to acquire hunters on the demand side, people that are 
interested in what you're offering." (HuntlerZ founder, personal interview, August 2015) 
 
Leveraging demand heterogeneity also allowed marketplaces to capture interest as 
it naturally emerged even if not all inbound demand could be initially fulfilled. For 
Spokes, efforts to build a bike rental marketplaces involved focusing resources on 
building the supply side first in New York city and then in other cities, but on the demand 
side, Spokes did not exercise any control over who registered or transacted.  
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“In terms of driving demand and creating that transaction, we were [initially] only going to focus 
city-by-city and build out that way. But we made the decision to allow growth to be organic and 
happen globally with no limits.” (Spokes chief marketing officer, personal interview, January 
2016) 
 
By leveraging heterogeneity on the demand side, host firms also gained insight 
into how different types of consumers behaved within the marketplace and identified the 
ones that were most likely to contribute to the growth of the marketplace. In some cases, 
access to heterogeneous consumers allowed host firms to develop their filtering 
capabilities over time and focus on creating value (e.g. offer additional features) for those 
more likely to continue participating, or voluntarily recruit others to the marketplace. In 
other cases, leveraging demand heterogeneity helped generate initial transactions—it 
allowed host firms to gain access to inbound demand, i.e. early adopters willing to join 
when the network was still small, and to then recruit appropriate supply-side matches. A 
couple of firms also took into account consumers’ interest in participating in locations or 
product categories in which resources were not initially invested when making decisions 
about locations in which the marketplace could expand next. In sum, openness to demand 
heterogeneity enabled the accumulation of resources (i.e. participants) and knowledge 
(i.e. information about participant preferences and existing behaviors) that helped not 
only generate initial interactions and but also facilitate future strategic choices.  
Although leveraging demand heterogeneity suggests any kind of growth would be 
welcome, this approach did not always facilitate growth. In cases where demand side 
requests could not be quickly matched with the supply side, founders observed cases of 
participant “disillusionment”, that is the loss of initial participants’ interest and the 
ensuing futility in trying to regain their attention. This appeared as a common challenge 
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in two-sided marketplaces where one side of the marketplace could grow faster than the 
other. However, founders and their teams did not appear concerned about managing the 
challenges emerging from leveraging demand heterogeneity at least initially. Instead, 
they focused on managing supply heterogeneity. 
Managing supply-side heterogeneity 
The data suggest that managing supply heterogeneity entailed control over the 
heterogeneity of initial supply participants based on transaction-related characteristics 
(i.e. participants’ skills, knowledge or assets) as well as identity-related characteristics 
(i.e. personal values and interests). I thus define supply heterogeneity as the variance in 
supply-side participant preferences, knowledge, skills, asset ownership as well as values 
and interests.  
Host firms pursued three strategies for managing supply heterogeneity, each of 
which was associated with different levels of control over types of participants: a) 
leveraging supply heterogeneity was associated with low levels of control; b) limiting 
supply heterogeneity was associated with high levels of control; and c) balancing supply 
heterogeneity with supply homogeneity was associated with both low and high levels of 
controls, allowing some heterogeneity to exist on certain dimensions while pursuing 
homogeneity on others. These three different levels of control over supply heterogeneity 
appeared driven by different assumptions about who assumed the risks of non-
conformity. Moreover, evidence in how and to what extent supply heterogeneity was 
managed appeared in marketing and public relations activities; partnering choices; 
decisions about what types of identify verification to make mandatory for participants, as 
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well as in choices about the geographic and product/service category scope of the 
marketplace at launch. Table 4.3 summarizes this evidence.   
Leveraging supply heterogeneity entailed little control over supply participants 
and thus an inclusive approach towards initial participant recruitment. Virtually anyone 
with any indication of conformity was allowed or invited to participate. By leveraging 
supply heterogeneity, host firms sought to make markets more accessible and more 
transparent for all parties involved. As the founder of Print-In-3D, a marketplace for 3D 
printer owners and consumers, said, “anyone can come and find anything” on the Print-
In-3D marketplace. Search functionality in this case was based on very few variables 
such as location (e.g. Print-In-3D, HuntlerZ) 
To recruit heterogeneous supply participants, host firms used both lean 
communication channels (e.g. emails, blogs, Twitter, Facebook and other social media) 
and rich communication channels (e.g. fliers, sponsorships of events, trade show 
attendance, and collaborations with groups or interest-based communities). The 
combination of different types of outreach channels enabled broad reach. 
In contrast, limiting supply heterogeneity entailed high levels of control over the 
heterogeneity of participants and an exclusive approach towards initial participant 
recruitment. By limiting supply heterogeneity, host firms created value for the demand 
side by assuming the responsibility of evaluating and vetting supply participants and thus 
promising demand-side participants access to the most relevant (e.g. experienced or 
knowledgeable) participants, as opposed to as many as possible. In other words, 
strategies for limiting heterogeneity aimed at recruiting relevant supply participants, and 
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in doing so, managing the risks of non-conformity from emerging in the first place. This 
heavy-handed approach to managing the supply side was expected to bring together 
particular types of supply participants who shared the same characteristics, values, and 
interests. Put simply, homogeneity was expected to foster conformity. 
In most cases, limiting supply heterogeneity was achieved by using primarily 
transaction-relevant criteria such as participants’ skills, experience or asset ownership. 
For Print-In-3D, important parameters for participation were a participant’s 3D printer 
and ability to process digital files and print different types of 3D parts. Less commonly, 
limiting heterogeneity was based on identity-relevant dimensions such as personal values 
and interests, particularly when marketplaces enabled exchanges related to lifestyle 
choices and hobbies (e.g. hunting, renting bikes when traveling out of town, or competing 
in triathlons). Alignment of participants’ personal values with those promoted through the 
marketplace (e.g. eliminating idle assets) and shared interests (e.g. sailing) served as 
additional criteria for selecting and recruiting relevant supply participants and in turn, 
increasing the likelihood of conformity. The founder of Gear Up articulated the 
importance of recruiting participants with particular values and ostracizing those without 
them and as the foundation of a ‘healthy community’. 
“There's a certain code of ethics and a certain code of behavior that we think makes peoples' lives 
easier, simpler, and better and that allows us to then transact goods through liquid markets. If 
there's a bad actor in the group, we want to flag them and get them the hell out of the community. 
A lot of people focus on community from the side of, "It's a good place." A healthy community 
ostracizes those who don't live up to the value expectations. If you're behaving poorly, you get 
booted or you get punished until you learn how to behave the right way. A community is 
ultimately a set of behaviors adopted by a lot of people, so that's what we're trying to create.” 
(Gear Up founder, personal interview, June 2014) 
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The Gear Up product manager further explained the importance of proactively managing 
heterogeneity and preempting non-conformity in creating a marketplace where people 
behaved appropriately. 
“We take a lot of stuff down from the website, when people try to come on and sell bikes that 
maybe they bought at Walmart. We don't let anything like that sell on our website, so we go pull it 
down immediately. We have very strict standards on what we allow. Even though it [our service] 
is low in cost, that doesn't mean it's low in value. We have very strict value standards for the site.”   
(Gear Up product manager, personal interview, July 2015) 
To recruit relevant participants and thus limit heterogeneity, host firms used 
primarily rich communication channels, which facilitated detection of participants 
already possessing desirable skills, knowledge and values. Rich communication channels 
such as face-to-face interactions in various events and tradeshows allowed founders and 
their teams to identify potential participants; see them act; and discuss their interests. 
These offline recruiting efforts facilitated the careful selection of relevant participants; 
and allowed conversations to occur that ultimately contributed to building trust between 
supply participants and the host firm all of which helped convince initial participants to 
join the marketplace. 
Balancing supply heterogeneity and homogeneity combined low and high levels 
of control over supply participants. It was an exclusive approach towards recruitment 
efforts on certain high level characteristics (e.g. categories of bikes accepted, condition of 
bikes accepted, preferred location) but was inclusive of anyone wanting to participate 
within those categories. These structuring of supply-side heterogeneity allowed host 
firms sought to create value for demand side participants by promising consumers access 
to relevant supply-side participants on certain dimensions. Balancing also invited and 
allowed supply participants not likely to conform immediately but who were likely to 
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become conforming given the right structures and information. In other words, a balanced 
approach to managing supply heterogeneity was based on the assumption that non-
conforming participants could evolve into conforming ones, thus creating more 
opportunities for the demand side to find an optimal match. The level of conformity 
sought in this case was not necessarily as high as in the case of limiting heterogeneity, 
but adequate enough for the marketplace to experience its first transactions.  
Balancing supply heterogeneity with homogeneity was manifested primarily in 
three sets of activities. First, balancing was manifested in efforts to limit participation in 
specific product/service categories and at the same time, populate those categories with 
as many sellers/providers as possible. In doing so, host firms wanted to appeal to as many 
consumer preferences as possible while maintaining some level of order and simplicity. 
For example, Pi Society created categories of topics such as Science, Technology and 
Math within which students and tutors could ask or answer questions. Spokes offered 
bikes within the ‘cruiser’, ‘road bike’ and ‘fixed gear’ category. Second, host firms 
sought to educate participants about which categories they should participate in and thus 
capture greater levels of value from their participation. 
“Every bike owner who has listed a bike on our site might only get a few requests per year. But 
they don't realize that I can see on our end a hundred other queries for bikes in their neighborhood 
and that their bike didn't match the description. So, we’re teaching our listers to list all their types 
of bikes. Don't list six road bikes of the same category, height wise and stuff. If you have a 
commuter bike, if you have a beach cruiser, if you have a cyclocross bike, if you have a road bike, 
there'll be very different people that rent those for that time period.” (Spokes chief marketing 
officer, personal interview, July 2015) 
 
Third, balancing entailed leveraging existing participants to expand into new product 
categories thereby relying on existing participants to introduce some level of 
heterogeneity to the marketplace. 
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Table 4.3: Activities for Managing Supply Heterogeneity 
LEVERAGING HETEROGENEITY 
(Low Control) 





MARKETING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 
• Anyone willing to participate, individuals 
and businesses 
• Online and offline recruiting channels 
• Any media outlets 
• Participants fulfilling certain criteria and 
anyone interested 
• Online channels amplify offline recruiting 
efforts 
• Niche media outlets 
• Participants fulfilling certain criteria and 
anyone interested 
• Offline recruiting channels (e.g. event 
attendance and sponsorship) 
• Niche media outlets 
PARTNERING 
• With large audiences • With both relevant and large audiences • With relevant but not necessarily large 
audiences 
IDENTITY VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
• Few identity verifications required (e.g. 
email verification and/or credit card 
verification) 
• Increasing number of identity verifications 
required as participants move closer to 
completing a transaction 
• Multiple identity verifications required for 
access and participation (e.g. email, credit 
card and social media verification) 
GEOGRAPHIC AND PRODUCT/SERVICE CATEGORY SCOPE 
• No or few limitations on participants’ 
location 
• As many product categories as 
owners/providers can offer 
• One location and one product/service 
category at time 
• More than one locations or categories based 
on inbound demand 





“A lot of people already have mountain bikes listed but then in the winter, they have skis and 
snowboards. They live at the mountains so they wanted to be able to list both, or they're near the 
beaches or coastal regions or in large major cities and they're like, "Hey, we have bikes but we 
also have surfboards and stuff and we really like to list this." (Spokes chief marketing offices, 
personal interview, July 2015). 
 
To recruit both heterogeneous and homogenous participants, host firms combined 
lean and rich communication channels but did so selectively, after they had gained access 
to homogenous participants. For example, online advertising was used to amplify offline 
recruitment efforts. It allowed host firms to stay connected to potential participants with 
whom host firms had already communicated in tradeshows and events as well as scale up 
operations in new locations given their limited resources. The founder of GrassHoppers 
explains this selective combination of offline (fliers) and online (Google Adwords) 
recruitment efforts: 
 “I want to scale out an entire city in one week. Certainly it's not possible with fliers now, right? 
We can use direct marketing to get a team in there, get enough demand to get a crew or two in 
there and then start expanding using online channels like Facebook because with the online 
channel, the acquisition is more gradual compared to the direct model. That's what I've learned. 
We can build up that way and expand fairly quickly using that method by combining online and 
offline.” (GrassHoppers founder, personal interview, December 2015)  
 
Control Dimension #2: Governing Cross-Side Interactions 
Findings also suggest host firms exercised control over interactions between 
supply- and demand-side participants. This form of control sought to govern cross-side 
interactions by determining the extent to which host firms structured, refereed, oversaw, 
and influenced when and under what terms the two sides interacted. Governing cross-side 
interactions had implications for promoting and ensuring behavioral conformity on both 
sides of the marketplace. 
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Host firms adopted three strategies for governing cross-side interactions, each of 
which was associated with different levels of control: a) lessening governance was 
associated with low levels of control (and limited involvement) over cross-side 
interactions, including but not limited to transactions; b) intensifying governance was 
associated with high levels of control over cross-side interactions; and c) balancing 
governance with participant autonomy was associated with both low and high levels of 
control, with host firms overseeing some aspects of the interaction while encouraging 
participant autonomy on others. Approaches to how and to what extent host firms 
governed cross-side interactions consistently appeared in decisions and actions around 
managing information and money flows between the two parties, setting pricing 
structures, resolving conflict and disagreements between transacting parties, and peer 
ratings and reviews. Table 4.4 summarizes this evidence. 
Lessening governance was a relatively arm’s-length approach to managing initial 
cross-side interactions. Host firms exercised low levels of control over interactions by 
allowing participants to select transacting parties, evaluate each other’s trustworthiness 
and determine without firm interference the process through which commitment to a 
transaction was made as well as the parameters of their transactions (e.g. pricing, timing 
of transaction completion, cancellation terms). Lessening governance sought to create 
value for participants by facilitating direct communication and evaluation (e.g. direct 
messaging functionality and seller reviews) and providing suggestions about relevant 
dimensions on which participants should be evaluated (e.g. pricing recommendations, 
rate of responsiveness). Through limiting involvement in cross-side interactions, host 
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firms helped transacting parties decide if and how to transact with one another. In doing 
so, they enlisted participants in monitoring conformity, and reporting non-conformity. 
Yet, host firms did not avoid all responsibility. They carried out some vetting of supply-
side participants, communicated to both sides information about appropriate behaviors, 
and promised informal resolution of issues on a case-by-case basis. For example, the 
founder of All Aboard, a marketplace for yacht rentals, left it entirely up to the owners to 
request from renters proof they could operate a boat. At the same time, All Aboard did 
not offer any insurance to protect parties from any potential damages: 
“We don't require renters to show proof they’re licensed to operate a boat. The boat providers 
usually require it. [...] At the moment, we don’t provide any insurance”  (All Aboard founder, 
personal interview, August 2015) 
 
In contrast, intensifying governance emerged as a relatively heavy-handed 
approach to managing cross-side interactions. Host firms determined whether and under 
what terms the two sides interacted by vetting supply participants, matching the two 
sides, and directly monitoring the quality of the outcome of exchange. In doing so, host 
firms preempted risk and sought to create value by carrying out selection, verification and 
filtering tasks on behalf of participants. This level of control over cross-side interactions 
appeared in host firms setting prices at which a product or service was delivered; 
verifying identities of both sides; recommending matches; and managing the back end 
operations of supply-side participants. Grasshoppers, for instance, carried out most of 
these activities so as to provide consistent service quality and decrease the cost of basic 
lawn care for homeowners. It exercised high control over cross-side interactions by 
setting expectations on both sides about appropriate levels of quality, and by charging 
homeowners a fixed price while paying providers a fixed wage per yard mowed. Others 
 50 
(e.g. Print-In-3D and HuntlerZ) controlled the matching process by routing incoming 
requests to particular sellers/providers that had proven capable of fulfilling similar 
requests. High levels of control over cross-side interactions also entailed constrained 
information flows between the two sides that kept any identification information out of 
the purview of participants both before a commitment to a transaction was made and after 
a transaction was completed. By exercising high control over the key terms of interaction, 
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INFORMATION FLOW MANAGEMENT 
• Direct messaging 
• No limitations on any information 
exchanged before and after commitment to a 
transaction is made 
• Direct messaging  
• Limitations on what kinds of information 
can be exchanged before commitment to a 
transaction is made; no limitations after 
commitment is made 
• No direct messaging  
• Types of available information determined 
by host firms 
PRICING STRUCTURES 
• Free for one side, membership or 
subscription fees for the other side (usually 
the demand) 
• Transaction-based fees charged to both sides • Free for one side, transaction-based fees 
charged to the other side (usually the supply) 
MONEY FLOW MANAGEMENT 
• Money can be exchanged outside the 
marketplace (e.g. in person) 
• Money cannot be exchanged outside the 
marketplace; third parties provide escrow 
accounts that release payments when 
transaction is completed 
• Money cannot be exchanged outside the 
marketplace; all money flows managed by 
host firm 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
• Resolution of conflict as it emerges on a 
case-by-case basis 
• No insurance 
• Proactive and reactive monitoring of quality 
of outcomes of exchange and consumer 
satisfaction (e.g. algorithms, pricing 
recommendations, automated flags of 
inappropriate language)  
• Insurance or firm-specific conflict resolution 
processes 
• Proactive monitoring of quality of outcomes 
of exchange and consumer satisfaction (e.g. 
through audits) 
• Routing orders to high 
performing/conforming participants 
• Insurance 
PEER RATINGS AND REVIEWS 
• Uni-directional (e.g. seller reviews) • Bi-directional rating and reviews • Uni-directional but not publicly available 
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host firms signaled to potential participants participant conformity would be effectively 
promoted and monitored.  
Balancing host firm governance with participant autonomy entailed both host 
firm and participants overseeing and determining the terms of interactions. Instead of 
preempting risk, host firms chose to manage risk if and when it emerged. They created 
value by giving participants selection, verification and filtering tools to use and evaluate 
each other’s trustworthiness. In contrast to intensifying governance where host firms 
entirely controlled the matching process, balancing governance with autonomy combined 
some level of influence over the matching process (i.e. by controlling which verification 
and filter tools to offer) but freedom for participants to choose with whom to interact.  In 
other words, balancing governance with participant autonomy aimed at integrating 
participants’ effort with those of the host firm. Balancing was manifested in activities that 
allowed participants to access each other’s contact information after a commitment to a 
transaction was made; managed conflict through insurance mechanisms or firm-specific 
conflict resolution processes; and allowed both parties to rate one another.  
In the case of Spokes, one example of balancing governance with participant 
autonomy comes is the protection guarantee Spokes offered both bike owners and bike 
renters. Spokes originally offered insurance that protected only bike owners from 
damages. More recently, it introduced an additional and optional form of protection, but 
this time for bike renters who could purchase liability insurance after they had already 
booked a rental. In this way, Spokes balanced its direct control over interactions with 
participants’ autonomy by offering both mandatory insurance (for the supply side) and 
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optional insurance (for the demand side).  In offering renters the option to purchase 
liability protection after committing to a rental, Spokes avoided interference in the 
decision process leading up to making a commitment to transact.  At the same time, it 
sought to play a more involved role in post-transaction interactions in case damages or 
accidents occurred.  Its chief marketing officer explained the rationale for offering this 
type of bike renter protection: 
“We really guarantee bikes at $10,000, but the way it works is that the renter is responsible for the 
bike. God forbid something happens and they can’t afford to pay, or they bail, or whatever the 
case is, we step in and pay. That's still for me a pain point for renters even if they acknowledged it, 
even if they had to pay for it, even if it didn’t stop them from renting… It is not going to stop them 
from renting, but it is still an inconvenience and I think a negative experience for our platform.” 
(Spokes chief marketing officer, personal interview, October 2015) 
 
Summary. In sum, host firms signaled to potential participants that they could 
effectively promote and monitor participant conformity with appropriate behaviors by 
exercising control over participants and their actions on two different dimensions. The 
first dimension of control was concerned with managing supply heterogeneity. Some 
cases implemented this type of control more strictly than others in the early stages of the 
marketplace. The second dimension of control was concerned with governing cross-side 
interactions, including but not limited to transactions. Once again, host firms controlled 
interactions to different degrees, some choosing a highly involved approach in 
determining how, when, and under what terms the two sided interacted whereas other 
chose a more arms-length approach, allowing participants to select and evaluate their 
transacting party.  
In the next section, I consider the interactions of these two dimensions of control 
and their implications for early-stage value creation. In section IV, I examine temporal 
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patterns and propose new theory about the process of value creation in two-sided 
marketplaces.  
III. A TYPOLOGY OF VALUE-CREATING ACTIVITIES 
The two aforementioned dimensions of control over the marketplace and the three 
different levels at which they were exercised form the basis of a 3X3 matrix that yields 
nine value creating activities. These activities signal to potential participants the benefits 
of participation, and facilitate initial participant recruitment. Figure 4.1 presents the 
typology of value-creating activities and table 4.5 summarizes associated tactics as they 
emerged from the data. In explaining below the nine types of strategies, I discuss each 
row of activities and the low/high combinations first, before discussing the middle 
categories. 
Aggregating activities leveraged supply heterogeneity and limited host firm 
involvement in cross-side interactions. They focused on recruiting as many sellers/service 
providers as possible who were already participating in other online channels (e.g. 
Craigslist, Angie’s List, YouTube) by promising them access to a new customer lead 
generation channel. In certain cases, these efforts were sufficient to attract initial 
participants. More frequently, however, host firms went as far as to create listings for 
potential providers without providers’ knowledge (e.g. HuntlerZ, All Aboard), or to find 
inventory from other websites and list it as their own (e.g. Gear Up).  
“We’d say, ‘hey, we created this listing for you.’ A lot of people were like, ‘Hey, perfect, thanks!’ 
They wanted more exposure.” (HuntlerZ founder, personal interview, August 2015) 
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In essence, aggregation strategies tried to create the illusion of scale—the marketplace 
appeared to have a lot of supply-side participants but many of them had not chosen to 
register. Informants acknowledged that people who registered did not necessarily end up 
transacting within the marketplace but were not particularly concerned about this because 
accumulating a certain number of registrants was an accomplishment host firms could 
then broadcast and convince more participants to join. Underlying these efforts was the 
assumption that populating the supply side would provide a sufficient incentive for the 
demand side to join.  
Another aggregating activity involved making non-exclusive content available on 
the host firm’s site—sometimes content that was not easily accessible online or digitized 
at all. For example, All Aboard’s founder often spoke of its desire to digitize sailing route 
handbooks only available in print. He confirmed that had All Aboard not ran out of 
funding, digitizing these sailing handbooks would have been its number one priority so as 
“to attract sailors and keep them aboard” (email message exchange, March 2016). In sum, 
aggregating sought to generate the illusion of scale by recruiting as many participants as 
possible from online directories or other marketplaces; creating accounts and listings on 
their behalf; and using not yet digitized and non-exclusive content to capture the attention 
of potential participants. 
Cases pursuing aggregating activities did so at different points in time. 
Aggregating was typically the first activity pursued in contexts where technology had not 
yet been widely adopted (e.g. hunting industry, sailing/boat rental industry), or where 
certain assets or people were not easily discoverable online (e.g. 3D printers). Through  
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Table 4.5: Strategies for Value Creation and Related Activities 





Aggregating • Recruiting as many existing sellers/providers as possible both online 
and offline 
• Allowing individuals, independent professionals and businesses to 
operate as sellers/providers 
• Creating listings on behalf of targeted participants without their initial 
knowledge or listing inventory from other online sources  









Cherry Picking  • Allowing any sellers/providers to participate while routing demand-
side requests or orders to specific sellers/providers  
• Opening up participation to all other sellers only after selected ones 






Leveraging Heterogeneity  
+ 
Balancing Governance with 
Participant Autonomy 
Guaranteeing • Providing insurance 










• Sponsoring events of interest-based groups 
• Partnering with non-profits promoting activities or behaviors similar to 
those promoted through the marketplace 
• Seeking exposure in niche media outlets catering to individuals with 














Regulating • Limiting supply-side participation to experienced and qualified 
sellers/providers who could service specific consumer segments or 
requests 
• Controlling prices at which the two sides transact 
• Optimizing back-end processes that facilitate independent 








Balancing Governance with 
Participant Autonomy 
Certifying • Offering or requiring sellers/providers to earn firm-specific 
certifications and showcase them on their profiles 
• Partnering with existing certifying bodies to offer sellers/providers 
opportunity to earn those certifications and showcases on their profiles 






Categorizing • Using industry-specific or other widely recognized categorizing 
schemes to organize sellers/providers into familiar categories 
• Devising new categorizing schemes emerging from initial participants’ 








Educating • Crafting personalized communication aimed at helping 
sellers/providers adjust certain listing parameters which were 
previously determined by participants 
• Recommending price levels at which sellers/providers may be more 
likely to complete a transaction 
• Creating original content aimed at training sellers/providers how to 














• Creating online forums and tools for any individual (participant or not) 
willing to interact with others based on their shared interests 
• Supporting and rewarding voluntary efforts to monitor behavior of 






aggregating, firms in these contexts created enough value to attract initial participants but 
over time they had to turn to other activities to survive (e.g. All Aboard, Buoyant, 
HuntlerZ, Print-In-3D). In other words, value from aggregating activities appeared 
insufficient for survival. In contrast, host firms pursuing, or planning to pursue, 
aggregating activities at a later stage did not anticipate aggregating alone to create value 
but considered it as part of the natural evolution of attracting more and more participants 
to the marketplace. Host firms pursuing aggregating at a later stage (e.g. Gear Up, 
Spokes) or planning to pursue it later (e.g. GrassHoppers, MaterialZ) focused their initial 
efforts on a number of other activities such as cherry picking, educating, community 
amplifying and guaranteeing (described below).  
Cherry-picking activities sought to leverage heterogeneity as well as intensify 
governance over cross-side interactions by proactively limiting matching participants and 
thus limiting risk to which they were exposed.  Findings suggest that cherry-picking 
activities did not prevent anyone from joining the marketplace, but took control of the 
matching process typically by routing demand-side orders or requests to specific 
sellers/providers. In doing so, host firms sought to enhance the likelihood consumer 
preferences matched the offering of sellers/providers. GrassHoppers pursued cherry 
picking first by hiring and training inexperienced individuals and then by approaching 
experienced lawn care professionals. In Print-In-3D’s case, proactively matching demand 
with capable providers ensured the quality of 3D parts and a positive consumer 
experience. Print-In-3D allowed other printers to fulfill an order only after it had given a 
selected number of printers the opportunity to take it on first. HuntlerZ attempted to 
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control the matching process in a similar manner by matching incoming dove hunting 
inquiries to dove hunting outfitters and landowners. However, this matching proved 
difficult without HuntlerZ having trusted relationships with the appropriate supply-side 
actors. Ship-N-Go’s founder began to pursue cherry picking by meeting with particular 
drivers to establish a more personal relationship with them hoping to create “a small 
group of engaged drivers” (personal interview, July 2015) whom it planned to choose 
from its already registered drivers. Similarly to HuntlerZ, Ship-N-Go found cherry-
picking activities challenging to pursue because the shipping industry relied heavily on 
personal relationships.  
“The last few weeks made me realize that a lot of the industry, a lot of the transportation industry 
is still very brick and mortar, still very much phone calls, and people versus the streamlined 
automation Ship-N-Go offers” (Ship-N-Go founder, personal interview, August 2015)  
 
Data suggest that cherry-picking activities were pursued when host firms wanted 
to streamline certain behaviors (e.g. sellers’/providers’ responsiveness), accelerate the 
speed of matching, or take advantage of situations in which few sellers/providers had the 
capacity to satisfy multiple consumers in relatively short timeframes (e.g. one 3D printer 
owner could process multiple orders in relatively short periods of time). Interestingly, 
cherry-picking activities entailed a background matching process that was not made 
public to the demand side. In doing so, host firms created value for participants by 
ensuring appropriate matches were made, and transactions produced high quality 
outcomes.  
Cherry picking typically emerged after the marketplace had generated several 
transactions, and after initial supply-side participants provided evidence of their 
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conformity. GrassHoppers was the only case pursuing cherry picking first, primarily 
because of the strict quality and efficiency standards it was trying to achieve. In this case, 
GrassHoppers used providers’ prior experience and training of ‘in house’ crews as 
mechanisms for ensuring supply-side conformity. In most cases, cherry-picking activities 
were followed by regulating activities, which entailed high levels of control on both 
dimensions. 
Similarly to cherry-picking activities, guaranteeing activities were also driven by 
the need to protect participants from poor-quality outcomes, but differed from cherry-
picking activities in that guarantees provided protection reactively, after transactions had 
been completed (e.g. insurance). A reactive approach to assuming risk balanced host firm 
governance with participant autonomy. Through guaranteeing, host firms offered post-
transaction assurances, but allowed participants to make pre-transaction decisions 
autonomously. Host firms got involved in interactions only after a transaction was 
completed and only if participants filed complaints. Guaranteeing activities included 
contractual mechanisms such as insurance and penalty terms (e.g. in the cases of Buoyant 
and Spokes) as well as non-contractual mechanisms such as firm-specific conflict 
resolution steps (e.g. in the case of Ship-N-Go). The latter option was useful when host 
firms did not have the resources to provide contractual mechanisms for protecting 
transacting parties. The founder of Ship-N-Go explained its non-contractual conflict 
resolution process, which sought to manage conflict between the two sides if and when it 
emerged. 
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“We have a five-step dispute resolution process…if things were to go wrong then we have a well 
defined process in place for people to go through that dispute and try and come up with an 
amicable resolution…there's nothing contractual for the 5-step process until the very end. 
Essentially, a lot of it is based on good faith but a lot of it is also based on good communication, 
assuming that both parties are willing to come to the negotiating table. If you've got some stammer 
who just joined the site with fake information and who wanted to steal someone’s spot, there's not 
much we can do unfortunately. I mean there are thieves everywhere, you can try and get as smart 
as you like but thieves are always going to find a way to rob a bank or steal jewelry, or do 
whatever they want to do. All you can do is, I think, minimize that risk as best as possible.” (Ship-
N-Go Founder, personal interview, July 2015) 
 
Insurance and other contractual guarantees appeared to be a priority for host firms 
in contexts were participants could experience bodily or psychological harm (e.g. death 
of a cyclist while renting), or when highly valuable assets were sold or rented (e.g. 
yachts). Although acknowledged to be important for generating trust between the two 
sides, contractual guarantees were less common in the early stages primarily because of 
the costs associated with offering such instruments, the newness of the peer-to-peer 
category which many insurance companies did not yet cover, as well as the difficulties in 
finding insurance partners when host firms had not yet become legitimate intermediaries. 
For instance, All Aboard and Ship-N-Go had searched for insurance partners but could 
not find ones offering or willing to create appropriate insurance instruments. In contrast, 
Buoyant was able to create a unique insurance instrument with a well-known insurance 
company when it launched its beta site. Its website archives show that insurance was used 
as a point of differentiation from competitors, and a key part of its value proposition for 
initial participants. Buoyant’s vice president of business development corroborated this 
finding and confirmed the importance of insurance instruments for attracting initial 
participants: 
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“In 2012, the idea [for Buoyant] was essentially born. Then, the founder was trying to secure the 
insurance platform, and that was something that was first of its kind and obviously a very key part 
of our business model.” (Buoyant, VP of Business Development, personal interview, July 2015) 
 
Community-amplifying activities limited supply heterogeneity and lessened 
governance of cross-side interactions. By limiting heterogeneity, host firms sought to 
recruit participants with certain qualifications (e.g. particular knowledge, skills or assets 
owned) or with certain identity characteristics (e.g. personal values and interests relevant 
to the marketplace). Community amplifying occurred through partnerships or 
sponsorships that enhanced the efforts of certain groups of individuals or communities 
who already came together to share certain interests or activities. Such groups were 
interest-based groups (e.g. cycling communities), or non-profit organizations (e.g. biking 
initiatives promoting alternative forms of transportation), or the audiences of niche media 
outlets (e.g. sports-related blogs). 
Community-amplifying activities facilitated recruitment of highly relevant 
participants, i.e. individuals whose shared interests and personal values motivated them to 
join the marketplace and transact with similar others. For example, the chief marketing 
officer at Spokes believed that individuals choosing biking as a lifestyle choice were 
more likely to participate in the Spokes marketplace. His view was corroborated by the 
findings of a Spokes survey with its participants. Bike owners renting their bikes on 
Spokes rated making money a less important motivation for participating than helping 
others bike, and sharing their interest in biking with other cycling enthusiasts. By 
recruiting these types of individuals, Spokes aimed at bringing cycling enthusiasts 
together and giving them the opportunity to interact with others who shared their interest. 
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Gear Up also pursued community-amplifying activities by donating its service 
fees to various bike initiatives and non-profits that promoted alternative forms of 
transportation. The Gear Up team also assisted in various events—some of which were 
organized by bike communities and non profits—so as to connect with relevant 
individuals whose passion for and commitment to outdoor activities would likely 
translate in purchasing or selling their equipment through the Gear Up marketplace. The 
founder of Gear Up further highlighted the importance of using personal values and 
interests as a criterion for selecting participants during an interview at a coffee shop 
where he saw an individual carrying a reusable bottle. He said: 
“That guy is my ideal customer. He's got an REI water bottle. That's a signal to me; that's who I'm 
targeting. And if I can get him hooked on it, so he tells some other friends of his how he sold his 
backpack, that's really great.” (Gear Up founder, personal interview, October 2015) 
 
Evidence suggests that community-amplifying activities were more effective 
recruitment mechanisms when host firms were able to extend as opposed to simply 
support the growth efforts of existing communities. For example, when Gear Up donated 
its transaction fees to particular non-profit organizations, it asked non-profits for access 
to their mailing lists as a way of reaching relevant audiences. These efforts however were 
met with little reciprocity from receiving non-profits. In contrast, Spokes found more 
interested collaborators in bike valet operators, which are typically operated by local 
governments and non-profit and provide the same service as car valets but for bikes 
during large-scale events. To further bike valets’ efforts and promote cycling as opposed 
to driving during major events, Spokes provided bike valets with additional bikes and 
personnel during major events when demand for bike rentals spiked. In return, Spokes 
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representatives raised awareness of peer-to-peer bike rental services among individuals 
biking to these events. The cases of Gear Up and Spokes show that community-
amplifying activities were often pursued in contexts where communities around a 
particular activity or hobby already existed. They were also pursued after, or in 
conjunction with, categorizing and educating activities (e.g. Gear Up, Spokes).  
In sum, community-amplifying activities created value for initial participants by 
offering them new channels through which they could pursue their interests, and grow 
their communities. In doing so, host firms leveraged individuals’ shared interests and 
values as a naturally occurring trust-building mechanism that also increased likelihood of 
participants conforming with appropriate behaviors. At the same time, host firms did not 
have to directly oversee interactions but relied on existing communities’ shared values 
and interests to govern they wanted to interact.  
Regulating activities limited supply heterogeneity and intensified governance of 
cross-side interactions. Similar to cherry picking, regulating focused on proactively 
selecting sellers/providers but limited supply heterogeneity further by capping supply-
side participation based on levels of demand, or owning inventory with which the supply 
side could be populated. Regulating also intensified governance by taking control over 
the matching process or the back-end activities of supply-side participants (e.g. how they 
arrived at pricing, or the systems they used to manage order fulfillment). For example 
GrassHoppers only allowed a specific number of experienced providers to satisfy demand 
(the number fluctuated based on demand in peak and low seasons), and determined the 
price of lawn care service. Print-In-3D took control over the price estimation process 
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through the use of software and algorithms. Spokes designed and attempted to 
manufacture a bike with which it planned to populate its bike rental marketplace 
particularly when it entered new geographic markets. A number of other cases turned 
their attention to helping supply side participants managed activities such as marketing, 
and customer service (e.g. GrassHoppers, HuntlerZ, Print-In-3D, Spokes). In doing so, 
regulating activities sought to exert more control over the matching process, while 
enhancing the value delivered to sellers/providers. 
In the case of Grasshoppers, regulating was also manifested in controlling who 
could participate on the demand side, i.e. lawn care services were made available to lots 
other than corner lots, smaller than 0.3 acres, and in specific neighborhoods. In a meeting 
between the GrassHoppers founder and the founder of one of GrassHoppers’ competitors, 
the GrassHoppers founder declined a partnership offer that would allow GrassHoppers to 
service the competitor’s customers because he doubted these customers would fulfill 
GrassHoppers’ criteria for participation. With its strict handle on participation on both 
sides of its marketplace, Grasshoppers sought to limit the number of dimensions on 
which the match could occur, thus ensuring conformity. 
Regulating activities created value by making high quality and speedy matches 
often at the expense of making numerous, and potentially less optimal, matches. In other 
words, highly relevant supply participants were able to produce high quality transaction 
outcomes and were considered more critical for value creation than a large number of 
heterogeneous participants potentially producing more transactions but lower quality 
outcomes. Regulating activities also created value by creating process innovation. For 
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example, Print-In-3D created software that pre-calculated the cost of 3D printing based 
on volume and other characteristics of the final part thus providing both sides with a 
uniform measure for calculating their costs. GrassHoppers created process improvements 
by developing a system for mapping “service areas” that determined how lawn care 
professionals were assigned to jobs. Lawn care professionals were matched to jobs close 
to one another thus traveling shorter distances and incurring lower fuel costs. 
GrassHoppers’ approach to scaling its marketplace service area by service area generated 
knowledge about staging growth in a way that facilitated the matching process and 
improved the ways in which the lawn care service industry operated. Spokes was 
similarly concerned about taking control over the matching process while populating its 
marketplace with high quality bikes. In collaboration with a design firm, it had created a 
bike, which won a high profile design award. Spokes planned to manufacture and lease 
this bike to “micro entrepreneurs” (Spokes chief marketing officer, personal interview, 
October 2015), i.e. individuals who would run their own independent bike rental 
businesses through Spokes. By introducing a specific high quality bike to the 
marketplace, Spokes wanted to decrease variance in quality of bikes listed, and speed up 
the initial growth of the supply side when entering new locations.  
For GrassHoppers, Print-In-3D, and Spokes, regulating did not prove the most 
‘scalable’ activity. The founder of GrassHoppers explained that recruiting experienced 
providers and ensuring high quality of service was critical in activating initial growth but 
suggested that high levels of control impeded the speed of growth and the achievement of 
large-scale network effects. 
 68 
“I think quality is pretty important. Number one, meeting providers face to face, I can see if 
they're for real or not. Number two, because it's a long-term play for us, we want the turnover to 
be really low. [Face to face meetings with providers] helped in filtering them out but I know it's 
not scalable at this time. (GrassHoppers founder, personal interview, February 2016). 
 
By imposing a tight grip on interactions through regulating, host firms also ran 
into the challenge of inducing behaviors that participants did not typically exhibit or saw 
as valuable. GrassHoppers for instance delivered service only on specific days of the 
week. GrassHoppers declined homeowners’ requests for service on different days, so as 
to maintain control over its service routes. GrassHoppers also had to train providers to 
abide by certain rules about when a service could or could not be rendered. When a 
home’s front yard was accessible but its back yard locked, providers were asked not to 
service that lot at all, move to the next one and return when the entire lot became 
accessible. Although these efforts ensured routing efficiencies, they required resources in 
setting participants’ expectations about what they could do in the marketplace or expect 
to receive from it. The founder of GrassHoppers explains this challenge below: 
 “Customers always think their grass is not high. The providers always think the grass is 
high. How do you set the expectation on both ends? On the supply side, it's really easy. 
They understand because they're in the industry. If we say, don't service anything over 
10" or if your mower can't mow it, then you can't service it, right? We’ve already done a 
lot to set expectations on the demand side but it's a constant battle.” (GrassHoppers, 
founder interview, February 2016) 
 
Certifying activities also limited supply heterogeneity but balanced governance 
of cross-side interactions with participant autonomy. Limiting supply heterogeneity was 
evident in broadcasting to all participants particular providers’/sellers’ conformity. For 
example, Ship-N-Go devised its own “level 3” driver certification, which included 
mandatory identity verification and background checks for all drivers committing to 
transport a shipment. In contrast to cherry picking and guaranteeing, with which host 
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firms assumed the responsibility of vetting participants and protecting them from poor 
transaction outcomes, certifying activities provided tools for sellers/providers to build 
credibility in the eyes of consumers. At the same time, host firms allowed buyers/renters 
to decide independently whether the certification and those who held it were trustworthy 
or capable. In doing so, host firms balanced their own involvement in interactions with 
participants’ autonomy.  
Certifying activities were typically pursued in contexts when few standards 
existed for evaluating a provider. Findings suggest the greatest challenge with certifying 
activities lay in legitimating the certification mechanism itself. As a result, certifying 
activities typically emerged at a later stage in the marketplace’s life. Ship-N-Go 
introduced its own certification soon after it launched but its failure to induce transactions 
suggests that firm-specific certifications are ineffective in the early stages when host 
firms are not yet recognized as credible intermediaries or certifying bodies. Over time, 
the Ship-N-Go founder realized that certifying its drivers using an existing certification 
by an independent body (e.g. a certification for transporting pets over long distances by 
an internationally recognized pet transportation association) would have been more 
effective in inducing transactions than its own certification. However, efforts to strike this 
partnership failed. Challenges in establishing one’s own certification was also evident in 
the HuntlerZ case which postponed its plans to offer the supply side the opportunity to 
earn ‘badges of expertise’ based on certain levels of activity and quality until the 
marketplace had achieved significant scale. 
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The MaterialZ case provides evidence of a different type of certifying activities 
that focus on legitimating not the participants but the host firm as a trusted intermediary. 
MaterialZ earned a number of different types of certifications for payment safety even 
before it launched. These widely acknowledged certifications were expected to lower 
both sides’ resistance to participating and were attainable with relatively little resource 
investments.  
Categorizing activities balanced heterogeneity with homogeneity and lessened 
governance over cross-side interactions. Contrary to aggregating, categorizing activities 
balanced supply heterogeneity with supply homogeneity by determining the categories in 
which sellers/providers could enlist while recruiting as many heterogeneous participants 
within those categories as possible. For example, MaterialZ allowed independent 
contractors to list material in categories based on classification codes widely used in the 
construction industry. Buoyant initially used categorizing schemes based on common 
yacht rental behaviors, such as occasions around which people rented boats (e.g. 
weddings, romantic getaways, labor day activities, fishing). It later changed its 
categorizing schemes based on location and consumer preferences for hiring a captain or 
handling a boat on their own. Categorizing leveraged homogeneity with heterogeneity by 
using particular organizing schemes to create order in what could be a chaotic list of 
options, while inviting heterogeneity within those categories. As a result, categorizing 
created value for sellers/providers by make their offering more relevant to a specific 
category, and for buyers/renters by simplifying the cognitive aspects of search. In turn, 
categorized helped both sides search and find appropriate transacting partners. 
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Categorizing activities typically appeared in the very early stages of the 
marketplace and were either followed or pursued in conjunction with educating activities 
(explained below). As already mentioned, in some cases categorizing activities were 
based on pre-determined and widely acknowledged categorizing systems (e.g. industry-
wide categories for construction material, or bike size). In other cases, categorizing 
schemes emerged from initial participants’ behaviors. Gear Up viewed effective 
categorizing to reflect buyers’/renters’ preferences and help induce more transactions. 
The founder explains below how information on participants’ interactions with inventory 
listings could be used to improve categorizing activities (e.g. organization, search, 
discovery). 
“The Instagram model would have been smarter for us. Now, we're building a mobile app…Even 
if you're not going to buy the bike because it's not the right size for you, you can still like it as a 
trade bike and that crowd information, that crowdsourcing gives us the opportunity to feature the 
best items on the site without having to do much work on our own.” (Gear Up founder, personal 
interview, July 2015) 
 
Educating activities balanced supply heterogeneity with homogeneity and 
intensified governance of cross-side interactions. Balancing heterogeneity with 
homogeneity in this case was evident in efforts to educate existing and potential 
participants about how to conform, i.e. how to participate successfully in the marketplace. 
At the same time, educating activities governed interactions more closely, albeit 
indirectly. Through educating activities, host firms sought to steer participants towards 
taking certain actions, which ultimately determined whether and under what terms a 
transaction occurred. For example, Spokes, Ship-N-Go and Gear Up used personalized 
onboarding emails, pricing recommendations, training handbooks, and advice to help 
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new and potential participants capture as much value as possible from the marketplace. In 
the case of Spokes, initial bike owners received recommendations for categorizing their 
bikes so that renters could find them more easily. In doing so, Spokes also improved the 
effectiveness of its categorizing activities. 
“Every single user that signs up, they get an email from somebody whether it's me, or anyone else 
in our company. Often times we will say “I just looked at your account. I saw this, this, and this. 
You might want to actually adjust your filtering or you might want to adjust which category your 
bike is in. I think you might have selected the wrong one. You have better luck here.” (Spokes 
Chief Marketing Officer, personal interview, July 2015) 
 
Relatedly, educating appeared more effective in promoting conformity when 
carried out interactively and in ways that asked participants to exert little effort to 
conform. In Ship-N-Go’s case, and to its founder’s surprise, drivers rarely downloaded a 
twenty-page e-book the founder had written about how to bid appropriately, earn positive 
reviews and deliver exceptional customer service. Moreover, the effectiveness of 
educating activities in promoting particular behaviors and conformity appeared greater in 
marketplaces where individuals often participated on both sides likely because their 
experience with both sides of the marketplace allowed them to acknowledge more readily 
the value of adopting particular behaviors. In this case, promoting and monitoring 
conformity was relatively easier and economized resources because the same educating 
efforts reached individuals who participated on both sides.   
Last but not least, community building balanced low and high levels of control 
on both dimensions. The limited evidence of community-building activities suggests that 
it was either a resource-intensive activity or one that depended on having recruited a 
critical mass of participants. The numerous references to “building a community” but few 
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observed actions suggest that community building required substantial resources that 
cases in this sample had not yet achieved. 
Balancing low and high control on both dimensions appeared in the data in the 
form of creating online forums for individuals wishing to interact based on a shared 
interest but without necessarily transacting; and leveraging the voluntary efforts of 
participants to monitor, support and educate new participants so as to promote 
conformity. Print-In-3D, for example, created an online forum for anyone to ask and 
answer questions related to 3D printing but stopped investing any resources in 
maintaining the site when those interactions did not translate in transaction growth. In 
several other cases, informants often referred to their goal of creating new communities 
either by inducing the participation of currently irrelevant audiences (e.g. expanding 
hunting and biking to non hunters and non cyclists), or by creating new types of 
communities (e.g. providing construction professionals with opportunities to come 
together and donate their construction expertise to charities). Yet, community building 
was expected to emerge after other ‘balancing’ activities such categorizing, and educating 
would have been pursued and new markets as well as new behaviors would have been 
created. 
“We've seen an uptake of archery and shooting, and people going to the ranges are now curious 
about harvesting their own meat. We've looked at doing an introductory course ‘Hunting for the 
Non Hunter’, and creating an entirely new market of people that didn't grow up hunting. How do 
you shoot a bow? How do you get a hunting license? How do you find a place to go hunting? 
Essentially creating a whole new marketplace. We are excited about testing that out.” (HuntlerZ 
founder, personal interview, August 2015). 
 
Informants’ definitions of ‘community’ also suggested that host firms envisioned 
new communities to emerge from making employee and participant roles permeable. 
 74 
Spokes’ hiring of community organizers who helped coordinate issues ‘on the ground’ 
promptly and independently provides some tentative evidence for this claim. 
“I didn’t even know about this until after it happened. I got this email from somebody that said 
they would be telling every single person possible about Spokes and that they were completely 
floored by the experience they’ve had because when they had a problem, our community 
managers in New York jumped on it, went and picked the bike up from the person, and got it fixed 
out of one of our partner bike shops. We paid for it, turned it around and got the bike back to him 
all within 24 hours. He was completely just in awe of how easy it was and how much we took care 
of him instead of fighting him on insurance claims.” (Spokes Chief Marketing Office, personal 
interview, July 2015) 
 
In sum, community building sought to create value for participants by providing 
them with the tools to engage in non-transactional interactions and share their interests 
and knowledge with each other. Typically discussed as a long-term goal, community 
building was expected to sustain participant recruitment and governance of interactions 
by integrating efforts of host firms with those of existing participants who would 
voluntarily recruit and monitor new ones.  
Summary. I have presented a typology of activities that explain how specifically 
host firms sought to create value for initial participants in the absence of compelling 
network effects. This typology is based on considering the interactions of two different 
types of control: control over supply heterogeneity and control over cross-side 
interactions. Controlling supply heterogeneity involves managing to different degrees the 
variance in initial participants’ knowledge, skills, asset ownership as well as personal 
values and interests. Controlling cross-side interactions entails governing to different 
degrees how, when and under what terms the two sides interact. In considering the 
interactions of these two forms of control, a typology of nine value-creating activities 
emerges.  
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In the next section, I build on this typology to map the sequence in which host 
firms prioritized activities. Patterns reveal two distinct paths each of which entails a 
different process of value creation in early-stage peer-to-peer marketplaces. 
IV. PROCESSES OF EARLY-STAGE VALUE CREATION IN PEER-TO-PEER 
MARKETPLACES  
In this section, I present findings on temporal patterns of value creation. I track 
the sequence in which each of the ten cases pursued the nine previously mentioned value-
creating activities over time. On average, patterns were mapped for an average of 25 
months with the starting point for all cases being the launch of their beta website (this 
point also marks the onset of participant recruitment efforts). The time period observed 
was between 9 and 41 months with the median timeframe also at 25 months. Emerging 
patterns suggest host firms pursued two alternative paths to value creation. Figure 4.2 
provides evidence for each process by grouping cases based on where they started and 
what activities they pursued over time. Table 4.6 presents the same evidence in narrative 
form. 
Given limited resources, host firms focused more attention and resources on 
putting certain activities into gear, which is when the shift is identified. Shifts in activities 
are identified when a particular activity was prioritized over others but prior activities 
typically continued to be pursued. In certain cases, activities were tried and then 
abandoned if they did not generate the expected growth outcomes or if they could not be 
implemented fully. Figure 4.2 indicates continuously pursued activities in opaque gray 
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boxes and tried and abandoned activities in striped boxes. The numbers indicate the 
sequence in which activities were pursued. 
The first path began with activities that exercised either low control on both 
dimensions, or low control on one dimension and high control on the other. Visually, host 
firms shifted from one corner to another corner of the typology matrix, i.e. they pursued 
almost no balancing activities. Cases following this path shifted activities less frequently 
(twice on average). They began by leveraging heterogeneity while lessening governance 
over cross-side interactions (e.g. through aggregating activities). Over time, they 
tightened control of either, or both, types of participants (e.g. regulating) and their 
interactions (e.g. cherry picking). Cases following this first process of value creation 
included All Aboard, GrassHoppers, HuntlerZ, and Print-In-3D. 
The second path began with activities that balanced control on one dimension 
followed by other balancing activities. Visually, host firms shifted from the middle 
column or row to the other middle column or row of the typology matrix, i.e. they 
pursued primarily balancing activities. On average, firms following this path shifted 
activities more frequently (3 times on average) than firms in the first path even though 
the average age--and research observation window--was similar with firms in the first 
path (24.75 months months for the first path and 23 months for the second path). They 
typically began by balancing heterogeneity with homogeneity while lessening 
governance of cross-side interactions (e.g. through categorizing activities). Over time, 
they shifted away from balancing and towards lessening governance activities (e.g. Gear 
Up shifted from curating and educating to community amplifying and aggregating 
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activities). Cases that tried to shift away from balancing activities and towards 
intensifying governance activities did so unsuccessfully, and then opted to lessen 
governance. For example, Ship-N-Go and Spokes shifted from balancing activities to 
cherry picking and regulating activities but when these attempts failed Spokes reverted to 
community amplifying whereas Ship-N-Go went out of business). Cases in the second 
path were Gear Up, Pi Society, MaterialZ, Ship-N-Go and Spokes. 
In both processes, shifts aimed at introducing more value to the marketplace so as 
to attract more participants. When pursued successfully, activities brought about growth 
in the numbers of participants or the numbers of interactions in the marketplace. Failure 
usually resulted from not having adequate resources to fully pursue an activity, or from 
experiencing disappointing outcomes such as minimal growth. Regardless of whether 
activities were successfully pursued or not, host firms used these experiences to garner 
insights about participant behavior and decide how to create additional value for both 
existing and future participants. Ultimately, both paths had the same goal: to grow the 
marketplace by leveraging early-stage participants and knowledge about their behavior to 
promote growth. The primary difference between these two “equifinal” processes of 
value creation is that one group of cases pursued activities that exercised either low or 
high levels of control whereas another group initially pursued activities that balanced low 
and high levels of control. Cases in the latter group tended to move to lower levels of 
control over time. I explain this processes and the implication for value creation in more 
detail below. 
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Path 1: Transitioning from Low to High Levels of Control  
The first process model appears to occur fairly consistently in four cases (All 
Aboard, GrassHoppers, HuntlerZ, and Print-In-3D). It typically began with aggregating 
activities so as to provide initial participants with some evidence of scale. Yet, openness 
to all participants combined with little governance over their interactions increased the 
likelihood of non-conformity and over time, raised concerns about controlling the quality 
of transaction outcomes. At the same time, limited governance of interactions often gave 
participants the opportunity to initiate interactions within the marketplace but complete 
them outside of it. For example, HuntlerZ initially invited as many hunting outfitters and 
landowners as possible to participate, and charged interested hunters a membership fee 
for gaining access to outfitters’ and land owners’ contact information. In doing so, 
HuntlerZ intentionally avoided capturing any value when the two parties transacted 
directly (e.g. when a hunting lease or a hunting trip was booked). As membership grew, 
the founders began considering how to capture value from multi-thousand dollar 
transactions originating but being completed outside the HuntlerZ marketplace. Their 
attempt in cherry-picking activities (e.g. routing demand for dove hunting trips to 
particular outfitters) failed primarily due to lack of trusted relationships with the 
appropriate outfitters. This and other failures in taking greater control over the matching 
process led HuntlerZ to transition towards providing website building, marketing and 
back-end operations management for outfitters. Essentially operating as the marketing 
arm for outfitters, HuntlerZ focused on the needs of supply-side participants and on 
developing trust and credibility with them. At the same time, HuntlerZ’s membership 
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marketplace was kept live throughout this transition, and used as a “sandbox” (founder 
interview, February 2016) to test features and messaging, and observe hunters’ reactions 
to these changes. The team then used knowledge on hunters’ behavior to improve the 
services it offered outfitters in its new line of business. In this way, HuntlerZ postponed 
the building of a two-sided marketplace until it had gained access and developed 
relationships with very specific supply-side participants who could later drive more 
similar supply participants to the marketplace. Two months after the shift, these efforts 
yielded tentative evidence of success. HuntlerZ had successfully recruited and on boarded 
seven providers and was recruiting more team members to keep up with growing 
demand.  
GrassHoppers followed a slightly different path. Its founder’s decision to fix the 
price of basic lawn care at $22 per yard was intended to provide affordable lawn care to 
consumers as well as force operational efficiencies on the supply side. Being significantly 
lower than the $40-$45 price point standard in the industry, the $22/yard number was not 
met with enthusiasm by experienced lawn care professionals. Even though the supply 
side was made accessible to anyone interested in participating, in the background 
GrassHoppers built its likely-to-conform team, i.e. it hired and trained inexperienced 
lawn care professionals. However, after six months, these cherry-picking activities 
proved expensive and difficult to scale. GrassHoppers then turned to working with a 
specific number of independent lawn care professionals carefully selected based on their 
prior experience and equipment. Still at the $22 price point, GrassHoppers created more 
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value for these providers by giving them more efficient routing schedules, and assuming 
marketing and customer service responsibilities (regulating activities).  
Print-In-3D also transitioned from lower to higher levels of control. Although its 
original, uninvolved approach (i.e. aggregating) proved successful for recruiting initial 
3D printer owners and generating some transactions, over time the founding team became 
aware of the importance of simplifying the matching process so as to give consumers 
what was most important to them, i.e. high quality 3D-printed parts. To do so, Print-In-
3D intensified control over interactions by giving specific 3D-printer owners the 
opportunity to commit to fulfilling an order. If none of these owners picked up the order, 
Print-In-3D then presented the opportunity to the entire marketplace (cherry-picking 
activities). A little less than half a year later, it began to select collaborators who had 
proven their ability to conform on dimensions of quality and speed of order completion. 
Print-In-3D further simplified and controlled the matching process by also determining 
the cost of 3D printing jobs through the use of software (i.e. regulating). The founder 
explained this transition: 
“We made a really big shift to our model from the approach where anyone can come and find 
anything and it's completely up to these people, to a more managed marketplace model where you 
come through us. Then whether through human touch, or software we help reprice it; we 
coordinate it. Then the finished product is delivered to you…This switch was kind of the marking 
point in our company's trajectory. If we hadn't made that change I think we probably wouldn't 
exist anymore. Since then, we really started growing fast and with the margins that we needed to 
have.”  (Print-In-3D founder, personal interview, December 2015) 
 
In the case of All Aboard, interviews as well as company archives provided 
evidence of aggregating activities at launch, i.e. recruitment of any yacht owners as well 
as charter companies willing to participate. Early on, the founder sought insurance 
 81 
partners but found no willing collaborators given the early stage of his firm. As the firm 
continued to recruit more participants, it turned to a limited number of cherry-picking 
activities by matching inbound rental requests for specific yachts with appropriate yacht 
owners and charter companies. Soon after, All Aboard ran out of funding and closed 
down its operations. Its short life span suggests that focusing primarily on aggregating 
activities particularly when the basis of exchange is a very valuable piece of asset (i.e. a 
yacht) is not a sufficient driver of value creation.  
Temporal patterns from lower to higher levels of control generate insights about 
an ‘outside-in’ path of value creation that seeks to attract as many participants as possible 
early on—regardless of their relevance—and over time, to exercise first greater control 
over their interaction and later to winnow participants particularly on the supply side to 
the most conforming ones. These transitions appeared driven by host firms’ desire to 
increasing the degree of participants’ conformity and the quality of their exchanges and 
ultimately to attract more participants as well as capture greater levels of value. For 
example, HuntlerZ’s transition from recruiting and servicing heterogeneous participants 
on both sides, to catering exclusively to the supply side aimed at delivering more 
compelling value to the side of the marketplace that proved the hardest to recruit. In 
doing so, HuntlerZ postponed the concurrent recruitment of both sides and focused on 
recruiting and providing value to the supply side with the expectation that these ‘one-
sided’ efforts would also provide access to the demand side (i.e. outfitters’ existing 
customers) and eventually accelerate growth on both sides.  
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Adopting a somewhat different approach, GrassHoppers and Print-In-3D 
continued to grow both sides of their marketplace but tightened control over several 
variables such as pricing, messages exchanged between the two sides, and customer 
service. Control over these key aspects of the interaction allowed host firms on one hand, 
to decrease instances of non-conformity and on the other hand, to modify those variables 
and determine if more optimal matches could be made. For GrassHoppers, for example, 
determining the neighborhoods in which service could be delivered, fixing price of 
service, and assigning providers to houses in the same neighborhood created routing 
efficiencies and decreased the cost of lawn care services. Yet, feedback from providers 
made the founder aware of an opportunity to utilize less strict routing schedules so as to 
allow service providers to earn more money and GrassHoppers to increase transactions. 
In other words, control over modifying tightly-controlled aspects of the marketplaces that 
allowed host firms to identifying new pathways to growth.  
“We found out that density [i.e. increasing number of homeowners within service areas] allows us 
to have a few providers going outside service areas without costing them a lot more time. And 
they're happy to get that extra money. We found out that if it's okay with the provider, it should be 
okay with us. We just don't want it to be a chaotic process where okay, any day you want, you can 
do it.” (GrassHoppers founder, personal interview, February 2016). 
 
In sum, the first process of value creation in early-stage peer-to-peer marketplaces 
entailed transitions from lower to higher levels of control. Lower levels of control sought 
allow as many participants as possible to join the marketplace, and to generate some 
preliminary evidence of scale that signaled to potential participants the marketplace had 
some momentum. In most cases, aggregating activities sought to create not actual scale 
but the illusion of scale. Over time and as the marketplace grew to include increasingly 
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heterogeneous participants, host firms intensified governance over cross-side interactions 
and later limited supply heterogeneity on the supply side to the most relevant participants 
so as to maintain some level of conformity and relatedly, quality of exchange outcomes. 
Path 2: Transitioning from Balancing to Low Levels of Control 
A second group of cases provided evidence of a value creation process that began 
with balancing low and high levels of control on at least one dimension, followed with 
more balancing activities before transitioning to lower levels of control. Unlike cases in 
the first path that transitioned from lower to higher levels of control, cases following this 
path (e.g. Gear Up, MaterialZ, Pi Society, Ship-N-Go, Spokes) transitioned from average 
to lower levels of control whereas attempts to exercise higher levels of control were 
mostly unsuccessful. For all cases in this group except Ship-N-Go, this process typically 
began with categorizing activities followed by educating activities. Ship-N-Go instead 
began with certifying activities that generated some revenue from verifying drivers as 
‘background checked’ but yielded no transactions with the demand side. Similar to other 
cases, Ship-N-Go engaged in educating activities to help existing and new drivers 
increase their chances of wining jobs through the Ship-N-Go marketplace.  
After educating activities were set in motion, both Spokes and Ship-N-Go then 
initiated guaranteeing activities, the former through insurance and the latter through a 
five-step conflict resolution process. After this point, cases started to move away from 
balancing activities and towards low-control activities such as community amplifying and 
aggregating. Gear Up and Spokes opted for community-amplifying activities that 
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facilitated recruitment of highly relevant participants. As those efforts were well under 
way, Gear Up then decided to start listing “fake inventory” from other online retailers 
(Gear Up founder, personal interview, January 2016). Although not actually fake, this 
inventory was not pre-owned but new and available from conventional retailers. At the 
same time, Gear Up expanded to other categories of items, such as camping gear thus 
further leveraging supply heterogeneity. Its aim was to populate the supply side with a 
greater number of listings that would project the illusion of scale and appeal to buyers’ 
heterogeneous preferences for equipment. These efforts accelerated growth in 
transactions week over week for about two months but growth halted when Gear Up fell 
victim of transaction fraud and its payment-processing partner made Gear Up responsible 
for paying tenths of thousands of dollars for the transactions it had facilitated. 
Interestingly, Gear Up initially monitored the identity of its initial participants manually, 
but as it decided to limit its involvement in cross side interactions, it relied on its payment 
processing partner to verify transacting parties’ identity. Gear Up’s experience suggests 
that lessening governances may release certain resources from monitoring interactions so 
that they can be invested in recruiting more participants, but may render host firms 
susceptible to participant misconduct, which in in this case threatened survival. 
Spokes also transitioned to community amplifying by sponsoring bike valet 
operators through which it reached cyclists. Although this proved to be successful for 
recruiting relevant participants, Spokes wanted to accelerate growth even further 
particularly when entering new cities. Its efforts to manufacture its own bike with which 
it planned to populate the supply side when expanding to a new location were postponed 
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citing the manufacturer’s capacity constraints. Spokes further pursued regulating 
activities trying to acquire a bike rental company, which would provide more high quality 
bike inventory. When the acquisition fell through, Spokes turned once more to 
community-amplifying activities, which provided access to relevant audiences and 
limited its involvement in cross-side interactions. 
Similarly to Spokes, Ship-N-Go attempted to broaden its involvement over 
interactions through cherry picking instead of regulating activities. This shift was 
attempted after several failed attempts to accelerate transactions, including an attempt to 
partner with a pet transportation association which would certify Ship-N-Go drivers for 
transporting pets. In Ship-N-Go’s case, cherry picking involved meeting one-on-one with 
a small number of drivers who were promised exclusive access to transporting requests. 
The founder of Ship-N-Go explained the purpose of these meetings:  
“My vision for what I want Ship-N-Go to be now is a small number of highly active 
drivers rather than a large number of drivers winning one contract a week or every two 
weeks. Really it is as simple as that. Highly engaged smaller number of drivers and then 
kind of growing on that: them being highly pleased with the product.” (Ship-N-Go 
founder, personal interview, July 2015) 
 
Pi Society also followed the second path of value creation. Its founder originally 
envisioned a marketplace for delivering tutoring services online and in real time. Pi 
Society began with categorizing activities that introduced broader categories within 
which math questions could be asked and answered. The founder initially populated some 
of these categories but efforts to attract others to do the same were met with little success. 
Pi Society then invested heavily in educating activities; the founder partnered with a 
national public TV channel and created education math videos, which were broadcast on 
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national TV and spoke in various conferences and on TV about the importance of math 
education in lifting young people out of poverty. Educating activities generated bursts of 
increased traffic to the marketplace but very few interactions. In response, the founder 
began to create a tutoring association that would certify tutors and become a source of 
supply side participants for his marketplace. These efforts were interrupted by an 
opportunity for Pi Society to become a partner of an existing community. Specifically, 
the founder was invited to use Pi Society’s technology as a journaling tool for individuals 
participating in an educational program that promoted science education through 
participation in makerspaces. Pi Society pursued this partnership and thus transitioned to 
community-amplifying activities. In doing so, the founder hoped to discover how 
makerspaces might become a source of supply-side participants, i.e. individuals 
interested in using their scientific knowledge to teach others. Similarly to Spokes and 
Gear Up cases, Pi Society shifted away from balancing activities, towards community 
amplifying activities that limited supply heterogeneity and lessened governance over 
interactions.  
Last but not least, MaterialZ also appeared to follow the second path. Because it 
launched much later than the other cases in this study, MaterialZ was still at very early 
stages of its life at the time this manuscript was written. This may explain why data 
existed only on categorizing activities. For example, the founder worked on developing a 
platform technology whose functionality was based on a classification system for 
construction material widely used in the construction industry, as well as on categories 
used by DIY retailers that were familiar to homeowners. These categorizing activities 
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aimed at simplifying search for material buyers and for maintaining some level of order 
and simplicity for material sellers. The continued study of the evolution of this 
marketplace will serve as a test case for confirming and further clarifying how this 
second process of value creation unfolds over time. 
The case of the non-conforming case 
The case of Buoyant does not appear to follow clearly either path of value 
creation. Although Buoyant initially pursued aggregating activities similar to cases in the 
first path, it did not transition to cherry picking or regulating activities. Instead, and 
almost concurrently, Buoyant pursued guaranteeing activities similar to cases following 
the second path, but made no other shifts up until the time this manuscript was 
completed. The uniqueness of Buoyant’s path may be explained as follows. First, 
Buoyant offered its initial participants what few other cases did: insurance. Its focus on 
securing an insurance partner as soon as it launched suggests that in the context of renting 
very valuable assets such as yachts, insurance helps absorb the risks of non-conformity 
and creates enough value for both sides to transact within the marketplace. Other cases in 
this study also acknowledged insurance instruments to be an important mechanism for 
growth but a costly one given their limited resources. Buoyant did not have substantially 
more resources than other host firms at launch, but its founder appeared to have strong 
ties to actors who facilitated the creation of its insurance instrument. Regardless of how 
Buoyant was able to offer insurance earlier than other host firms, the key insight is that in 
when guaranteeing activities are costly to pursue, host firms attempt to either broaden 
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Figure 4.2: Temporal Patterns of Value Creation Activities In Early-Stage Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces 
PATH #1 CASES - FROM LOW TO HIGH LEVELS OF CONTROL 
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Figure 4.2: Temporal Patterns of Value Creation Activities In Early-Stage Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces (continued) 
PATH #2 CASES - FROM BALANCING TO LOW LEVEL OF CONTROL 
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Figure 4.2: Temporal Patterns of Value Creation Activities In Early-Stage Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces (continued) 
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Figure 4.2: Temporal Patterns of Value Creation Activities Pursued In Early-Stage Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces 
(continued) 
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Table 4.6: Temporal Patterns of Value Creation Activities in Narrative Form 
   
PATH 1: FROM LOWER TO HIGHER LEVELS OF CONTROL 
      
ALL ABOARD Aggregating => Guaranteeing => Cherry Picking   
 Allowed and invited both 
yacht owners and charter 
companies to participate on 
the supply side and anyone 
on the demand side 
regardless of their ability to 
operate a boat; allowed 
them to determine pricing, 
and customer service 
Searched for insurance 
partner that would protect 
yacht owners’ property 
from damages albeit 
unsuccessfully; sought 
partnership with licensing 
associations for verifying 
renters’ ability to operate a 
boat 
Matched incoming 
demand for renting 




      
HUNTLERZ Aggregating => Cherry Picking => Regulating   
 Allowed and invited all 
hunters and outfitters/land 
owners to participate  
Matched incoming 
demand for dove hunting 
to appropriate outfitters 
and land owners 
Focused on 
developing trust and 
credibility with 
outfitters by providing 
them with a complete 
package of services 




      
GRASSHOPPERS Cherry Picking => Regulating     
 Fixed price of service at 
$22/yard and tried to recruit 
lawn care professionals. 
Ended up hiring and 
training inexperienced 
providers. On demand side, 
it focused on specific lots in 
specific neighborhoods. 
Let go of ‘in-house’ crew 
and selected independent 
and experienced lawn care 
professionals. Kept price 
of service at $22/yard but 
gave providers the 
opportunity to service 
more yards per hour due to 
routing efficiencies. 
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Table 4.6: Temporal Patterns of Value Creation Activities in Narrative Form (continued) 
 
PRINT-IN-3D Aggregating => Cherry Picking => Regulating   
 Allowed and invited 
anyone with a 3D printer 
to participate and any 
individual in need of a 3D 
printed part to place an 
order. Parties were given 
full autonomy over 
pricing and delivery 
options. 
Allowed demand-side to 
submit orders to the 
marketplace as well as to 
specific printers. Routed 
incoming orders to 
specific 3D-printer 
owners first. If no match 
was found, the order 
made available for any 
other printer owner to 
fulfill.  
Selected 3D-pritner 
owners who had 
consistently proved 
reliable to fulfill the 
bulk of orders. Took 





      
PATH 2: FROM BALANCED TO LOWER LEVELS OF CONTROL 
      
GEAR UP Categorizing => Educating => Community => 
Amplifying  
Aggregating  
 Selected retailers and 
specific individuals with 
whom the founding team 
had existing relationships 
to populate the supply 
side. 
Reviewed each listing 
and provided sellers with 
pricing suggestions; 
introduced concierge 
service to minimize bike 
owners’ effort to list their 
equipment for sale 
Targeted, attended and 
sponsored biking 
events, e.g. triathlons, 
weekly cyclist meet-
ups, to find participants 
most interested in 
sports 
Introduced more 
product categories and 
opened participation to 
two more cited; listed 
inventory available on 
bike retailers’ sites as 
if it were its own 
 




Table 4.6: Temporal Patterns of Value Creation Activities in Narrative Form (continued) 
 
PI SOCIETY Categorizing => Educating => Certifying => Community => 
Amplifying  
 
 Created broad topics 
within which math 
questions could be asked 
and answered; invited 
teachers to contribute and 
any individual to ask 
questions; founder first 
populated marketplace 
with some questions and 
answers  
Created educational 
videos about the value of 
math education in lifting 
people out of poverty 
Sought to create an 
association for tutors 
and a tutoring 
certification 
Partnered with an 
educational initiative to 
promote participation 
in makerspaces and 
offered its technology 
as a journaling and 
knowledge exchange 
tool for program 
participants 
 
      
SHIP-N-GO Certifying => Educating => Guaranteeing => Certifying => Cherry Picking 
 Provided drivers with a 
firm-specific certification 
that acknowledged them 
as ‘level 3’ certified if 
their background check 
was ‘clean’ 
Created an e-book for 
drivers on how to win 
bids and behave 
professionally; wrote blog 
posts with shipping-
related advice and 
information  
Searched for insurance 
partners that would 
provide shippers with 
protection for any 
valuable items shipped 
Entered in discussion 
with an international 
association that could 
certify Ship-N-Go 
drivers to transport pets 
Met in person with 
specific drivers to 
enlist them in a select 
group of drivers with 
exclusive access to 
shipping gigs 
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Table 4.6: Temporal Patterns of Value Creation Activities in Narrative Form (continued) 
 
SPOKES Categorizing => Educating => Guaranteeing => Community => 
Amplifying 
Regulating 
 Introduced bike 
categories within which 
bike owners could list 
their bikes; allowed 
anyone to participate 
from any country in the 
world but focused 
recruitment on one city 
first 
Reached out to bike 
owners with personalized 
recommendations on how 
they could list their bikes 
more appropriately and 
win more bids 
Introduced a 
‘guarantee’ for bike 
owners that protected 
their property if a bike 
renter could not pay for 
it 
Sponsored bike valets 
and provided them 
with bikes and staff to 
run their operations 
during major 
conferences 
Designed its own 
proprietary bike and 
sought to manufacture 
it in large numbers and 
lease the bikes to 
individuals interested 
in running their own 
small bike rental 
businesses in cities 
where Spokes planned 
to expand 
MATERIALZ Categorizing      
 Based functionality of its 
technology on industry-
wide classification 
system for construction 
material as well as on 
categories used by DIY 
retailers that were 
familiar to home owners  




their involvement through cherry picking and regulating activities, or balance their 
involvement with participant autonomy through certifying activities. All of these 
activities help absorb some of the risks of non-conformity that are likely to deter 
participation 
Summary. In sum, four cases followed a path of value creations that entailed 
transitions in activities from one end of the control continuum to the other, whereas five 
cases followed a second path that stayed with balancing activities before transitioning to 
lowers levels of control. Shifts in the first path appeared driven by host firms’ desire to 
increasingly control the quality of transaction outcomes but only after a sufficient number 
of participants had joined the marketplace. In other words, host firms following the first 
path appeared initially concerned about attracting large numbers of participants, 
regardless of their likelihood to conform, and winnowing the most relevant ones once the 
marketplace had satisfactorily scaled. The challenge of promoting and monitoring 
conformity throughout this process rested with host firms. In contrast, shifts in the second 
path appeared driven by host firms’ desire to increase the number of participants but only 
after relevant participants had joined the marketplace, and high quality interactions had 
occurred. In this second path, host firms were initially more interested in recruiting 
relevant participants, which often came at the cost of relatively slow growth. Their 
objective was initially to facilitate optimal matches that left both sides satisfied than with 
generating many and potentially suboptimal matches. Yet, over time, host firms lessened 
control over the marketplace so as to accelerate growth. They invited more heterogeneous 
participants and/or lessened control over their interactions. The initial conformity host 
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firms were able to promote through their earlier efforts served as evidence of successful 
participation and operated as a participant-driven control mechanisms for new 
participants to maintain acceptable levels of conformity.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Prior research has studied two-sided marketplaces through a transactional lens 
(Gawer, 2014), focusing on how price structures incentivize potential participants to join 
the marketplace, and continue participating over time (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and 
Jullien 2003; Evans, 2003; Parker and van Alstyne 2005, Rochet and Tirole 2003b; 
2006). Moreover, it primarily studies host firms through formal economic models and in 
limited cases, studies well-established two-sided marketplaces, which already have 
significant levels of resources including participants. This literature overlooks 
recruitment mechanisms and strategies for building two-sided marketplaces other than 
pricing, and provides limited evidence and theory about the early-stages and the 
evolution of two-sided marketplaces (Gawer, 2014). To address these oversights, I 
conducted an inductive study of early-stage strategies in two sided marketplaces. 
Findings from pilot data revealed unique challenges faced by a particular and under-
researched type of two-sided marketplace, the peer-to-peer marketplace. The main part of 
this research tracked the evolution of ten peer-to-peer marketplaces focusing on activities 
for recruiting initial participants, and coordinating their interactions. 
Findings from this study suggest that recruiting initial participants and inducing 
their interactions is more complex than the common economic argument of subsidizing 
the costs of participation. Consistent with prevailing arguments in prior research, this 
research also finds that giving participants opportunities to earn income and subsidizing 
their cost of participation creates some incentive for them to join the marketplace even 
when a critical mass of other participants does not yet exist. However, this study moves 
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beyond a transactional view of marketplaces and questions that financial rewards and 
subsidization are adequate value creation and recruitment mechanisms. Findings provide 
evidence that extends prior research on two-sided marketplaces. Specifically, host firms 
pursue a number of value-creating activities that signal to initial participants a number of 
non-transactional benefits such as providing them with new channels to pursue their 
preferred activities (e.g. competing in triathlons, biking while traveling), connect with 
individuals of similar interests and values (e.g. outdoor enthusiasts, math and science 
scholars), increase their productivity (e.g. spending less time traveling between lawn care 
jobs), and publicly showcase their expertise and knowledge. These non-financial 
incentives and rewards, combined with financial ones, paint a more complete picture of 
what host firms actually do to build two-sided marketplaces.  
This study extends our knowledge of strategies in two sided marketplaces in four 
ways. First, I show that host firms seek to create value by encouraging participant 
conformity with appropriate behaviors. Conformity implies predictability in behavior and 
reduced risk. As a result, host firms must find ways to signal to potential participants that 
conformity is fostered, and non-conformity is monitored and penalized. Although host 
firms promise potential participants an eventually large enough network through which 
transactions will be made more efficient, early on, the value they create centers on their 
ability to promote participant conformity with appropriate behaviors and project to 
potential participants that non-conformity is effectively monitored.  
Second, I show that host firms foster conformity by exercising control on two 
dimensions: participant heterogeneity and cross-side interactions. Control over 
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participant heterogeneity in the peer-to-peer context is initially focused on the supply side 
while the demand side experiences little to no control. Control over heterogeneity seeks 
to promote conformity on both transaction-relevant dimensions (e.g. accurate and 
complete descriptions of products and services) and identity-relevant dimensions (e.g. use 
of language, and friendliness) (see table 4.2). Some cases enforce strict control over 
participant heterogeneity and thus limit it; others are open to any willing participants and 
thus leverage it; and other balance heterogeneity with homogeneity.  
Participant heterogeneity has been found to challenge firms’ ability to generate 
network effects (Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 1999) or strengthen existing network effects 
(Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). By definition, heterogeneity challenges efforts to promote and 
monitor uniformity in behavior. Prior studies on two-sided marketplaces have considered 
heterogeneity on the supply side only in technical terms, and on the demand side as the 
function of the utility consumers derive when transacting in a particular marketplace (e.g. 
Armstrong and Wright, 2007; Sun & Tse, 2007). Even though prior research has hinted at 
the importance of considering heterogeneous consumer preferences in marketplace 
strategy (Zhu and Iansiti, 2012) it has not examined whether and how participant 
heterogeneity might be intentionally managed to facilitate marketplace growth. One of 
the main contributions of this study is the evidence it provides on how specifically host 
firms intentionally manage the level of participant heterogeneity in their marketplace so 
as to generate network effects. 
On a second dimension of control, host firms govern cross-side interactions to 
promote and monitor conformity. They become involved in various degrees in how when 
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and under what terms the two sides interact. Some cases intensify governance and thus 
take control over the key terms of interaction; others lessen it and thus allow participants 
to find, select and evaluate transacting parties with little interferences; and others balance 
governance with participant autonomy. Prior research has discussed governance 
mechanisms such as exclusivity terms (Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Hagiu & Lee, 2011) 
and technological standards (Wareham et al, 2014). In the peer-to-peer context however, 
where supply participants do not have to develop complementary technological products 
to participate, governance is concerned with influencing and monitoring how participants 
behave and treat each other. Conformity in this context is desirable so as to ensure that 
participants behave appropriately and create value for each other. The key insight here is 
that host firms govern cross-side interactions either directly or indirectly, i.e. by 
integrating participants and information about their behavior in governance efforts. 
Moreover, host firms initially choose to govern interactions to different degrees. Some 
intensify governance and preempt the risks of non-conformity; others lessen governance 
and provide participants with tools to select appropriate transacting parties; and others 
balance governance with participant autonomy, controlling some aspects of the 
transaction but allowing participants to select a transacting party. 
Third, this research extends existing knowledge on two-sided marketplaces by 
considering the interactions between the aforementioned dimensions of control and their 
implications for value creation. The proposed typology of nine-value creating activities 
(figure 4.1) provides evidence of the broad repertoire of activities firms in two-sided 
markets utilize for growth. 
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Fourth, patterns in activities pursued over time provide evidence and contribute to 
new theory about the process of early-stage value creation in two-sided marketplaces 
(figure 4.2). The two alternative but “equifinal” paths of value creation (figure 5.1) cast 
new light on the tradeoffs between two different approaches to designing a two-sided 
marketplace. These paths capture the tension between increasing the number of 
participants or the volume of transactions and maintaining the relevance of participants 
and the quality of their interactions. The first path suggests that openness to 
heterogeneous participants early on will eventually require more direct oversight over 
participants and their interactions so as to ensure their conformity. In contrast, restricting 
heterogeneity early on lessens the need for direct firm oversight but eventually requires 
lessening that control and inviting more heterogeneous participants so as to accelerate the 
growth of the marketplace. Both approaches leverage access to initial participants as 
growth resources albeit in different ways. The first harnesses the opportunities of 
heterogeneity whereas the second harnesses the opportunities of homogeneity to recruit 
initial participants. 
Lastly, these paths present evidence of how host firms not only recruit but also try 
to sustain participation over time. Findings from Cennamo and Santalo’s (2013) work 
suggest that strategies for recruiting versus sustaining participation might conflict as the 
marketplace grows. Specifically, introducing product variety conflicts with strategies for 
securing exclusivity contracts, and decreases complementors’ willingness to develop new 
products as the marketplace becomes more crowded (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013). In the 
peer-to-peer context, certain host firms appear more concerned about ‘crowding out’ 
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effects than others, and intentionally manage the heterogeneity of their participants either 
by blocking the participation of those unlikely to conform ex ante or by winnowing out 
poor performers ex post. Together, these two paths advance new theory about alternative 
paths of value creation in peer-to-peer marketplaces. 
Contribution to Theories of Resource Orchestration  
In theorizing about the strategies that consider the role of participants in early-stage value 
creation in two-sided marketplaces, this study conceptualizes ‘leverage’ in resource 
terms. Leverage, defined as “exercising an influence that is disproportionate to one’s 
size” (Thomas et al, 2014: 206), is a key concept in the literature on two-sided 
marketplaces. A host firm’s source of leverage is typically thought to be architectural, 
that is, to stem from “its product and service architecture” that becomes  “a direct driver 
of value creation and competitive advantage, as it provides a mechanism to achieve 
greater outputs from the same level of inputs”  (Thomas et al, 2014: 206). Architectural 
leverage, for example, is manifested in attracting complementors, who build compatible 
products and increase the value of the underlying technology without the host firm 
investing additional resources (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2014).  
In peer-to-peer marketplaces, architectural leverage is not a key aspect of value 
creation. Instead, leverage comes from host firms having not only access to participants 
but also knowledge about participants’ preferences, and behaviors. Leveraging 
participants and their contributions as growth resources stands in contrast to the 
prevailing view in the strategy literature, which considers valuable resources those that 
are owned and controlled directly by the firm (Barney, 1991) and accumulated internally 
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Figure 5.1: Alternative Paths for Promoting and Monitoring Participant Conformity in Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces 
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(Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Sirmon et al 2007; 2011). 
According to Dierickx and Cool (1989), strategic resources are the cumulative result of 
adhering to a set of consistent policies over a period of time. Bowman and Ambrosini add 
that “new use value is created by the actions of organizational members, who combine to 
transform the use values that the organization has acquired” (Bowman & Ambrosini, 
2000: 5). In other words, valuable resources are built inside the firm out of the purview of 
customers or other external actors. 
Until Sirmon et al’s (2007; 2011) work on research orchestration, no cohesive 
framework existed about how specifically firms transform resources into valuable ones. 
Sirmon et al (2007; 2011) developed a framework for well-established firms that 
theorizes about three resources development processes: a) structuring resources, b) 
bundling resources into capabilities, and c) leveraging capabilities to appropriate value as 
well as test and refine capabilities. These processes explain how firms accumulate or 
develop valuable resources inside firm boundaries. Moreover, they are based on the 
assumption that customer preferences can be known only after firms have already 
deployed their capabilities in product markets. In contrast to Sirmon et al’s (2007; 2011) 
assumptions, I present evidence and develop new theory about the process of resource 
orchestration in nascent and resource-constrained firms. Although consumers and other 
external stakeholders lie outside firm boundaries and beyond the direct control or 
ownership of host firms (Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2010; Zander & Zander, 
2005), in peer-to-peer contexts, external stakeholders provide key resources, which when 
integrated with internal ones, contribute to both value creation as well as new resource 
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development. For example, All Aboard’s customer service archives reveal efforts to 
solicit extensive feedback from initial yacht owners so as to improve the very basic 
functionality of All Aboard’s initial website versions. All Aboard’s conversations with 
potential customers sought to gain insights about which resources and capabilities had to 
be further developed so that they attracted more participants (e.g. functionality that 
allowed owners to list their boats in multiple geographic locations). Similarly, several 
other cases not only considered but invested significant resources in understanding the 
preferences, motivations, and behaviors of marketplace participants (e.g. Spokes 
collaborated with an economist and carried out an extensive study on participant 
behavior). They then used this knowledge to improve the functionality of their 
technology including algorithms and user interface design, fee structures, marketing 
effectiveness and more broadly, their ability to elicit and sustain cross-side interactions. 
In sum, although prevailing views posit that value is created through actions of 
organizational members once resources are available, new technologies and new business 
models enable the production of value across firm boundaries. In these contexts, firms 
create and capture value by purposefully orchestrating resources both internally and 
externally, i.e. by determining how all of these actors come together, and interact 
appropriately. At the same time, this orchestration process adjusts and evolves based on 
insights that emerge from participant behavior. Knowing how resources can be built, 
especially in contexts where they are scarce, provides guidance about how firms can 
access, create, and use resources to create value. The proposed framework provides initial 
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guidance for identifying strategies and supporting activities that are observable, 
measureable, and replicable.  
Contributions to New Forms of Organizing 
Puranam and colleagues (2013) advocate for “new theories of organizing that 
explain and indeed predict the emergence of new forms” (Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig, 
2014: 163). New forms of organizing, Puranam et al (2014) suggest, entail novel 
solutions to the traditional problems of organizing such as task division, task allocation, 
reward provision, and information provision. Alternatively, Felin and Zenger (2014) 
suggest that different approaches to organizing vary based on the communication 
channels firms use to induce the voluntary contribution of external stakeholder, the 
incentives offered to employees to search for solutions, and the assignment of property 
rights over new knowledge. Taken together, these arguments suggest that explaining and 
predicting how firms organize and compete under a more ‘open’ paradigm involves 
alternative governance mechanisms. This study generates insights about how firms 
organize their efforts to solve core organizing issues such as division of labor and 
integration of effort. In particular cases, host firms carry key activities whereas in others, 
host firms share the load with marketplace participants. Peer-to-peer marketplaces are a 
context particularly fit for studying new forms of organizing such as the mechanisms for 
dividing and allocating production tasks among organizational members and consumer, 
providing financial, reputational and identity-enhancing rewards, and managing 
information flows between the two sides. 
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Implications for Entrepreneurs and Managers 
This study also presents both high level and tactical evidence useful for 
entrepreneurs trying to spark the interest of initial marketplace participants, and resolve 
the chicken-and-egg problem inherent in two-sided markets. The proposed strategies and 
process models provide guidance about concurrently considering how to manage types of 
participants and their interactions. These two forms of control highlight the importance of 
considering not only consumers’ willingness to pay, but also their willingness to behave 
in particular ways.  
This research also informs entrepreneurs and managers who may not be operating 
in two-sided markets but who are looking to induce and sustain collaborations with 
consumers. As hardware and software technologies enable increasing levels of 
collaboration and connectivity, more firms are likely to seek the contributions of external 
stakeholders such as technology users, user communities, customers, and end consumers 
throughout the value chain (Priem, 2007; Tantalo & Priem, 2016; Wiertz & Ruyter, 
2007). Fostering these interactions will continue to be an important source of opportunity 
and innovation that allows firms to chart alternative paths to competitive advantage. 
Future Directions 
Future research may examine the performance implications of different processes 
of value creation and propose a prescriptive model of value creation in two-sided 
marketplaces. For example, when control is lessened over interactions and information is 
 109 
allowed to follow freely between supply-side and demand-side participants, the question 
is raised about which interactions convert to transactions and which do not.  
It is important to note that in particular peer-to-peer marketplaces, participants 
were likely to participate on both sides (e.g. Spokes, Gear Up). In the case of Spokes, 
individuals who rented bikes often listed their bikes for rental. Similarly, individuals 
participating in the Gear Up marketplace were likely to sell and purchase equipment. In 
these cases, host firms were able to reach both audiences through the same activities and 
concurrently grow both sides of their marketplace. Yet, only a portion of participants 
took on both roles (usually between 20-30%) and firms had no ex ante knowledge of who 
would participate on both sides. Despite participants taking on both roles, host firms 
managed each side separately precisely because they could not predict who exactly would 
participate on both sides. Future research may examine how participants’ duality of roles 
facilitates or hinders the growth of the marketplace. 
Other scholars may want to explore further the often-discussed concept of 
‘community’ in the long-term performance of two-sided marketplaces.  The proposed 
community building strategies in this study were referenced in interviews but not directly 
observed. Future studies may choose to study how community building occurs, or how it 
enables and becomes enabled by other strategies.  
Lastly, the increasing attention on firms in the ‘sharing economy’ and its 
implications for government regulation presents an additional opportunity for research. 
For example, a recent ruling on a class action lawsuit brought against Uber by Uber 
drivers allowed Uber to keep its drivers as independent contractors but required the 
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company to pay $100 million in damages to its drivers, and create an association for 
drivers so that they can bring their grievances collectively to Uber. In Austin, Texas, a 
law soon to be brought to vote may require Uber and Lyft to collect fingerprints for all 
drivers. Future research may examine how different institutional environments across US 
states, and across different countries facilitate or constrain the growth of peer-to-peer 
marketplaces.   
  
 111 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
With this study, I sought to address the lack of theory and evidence on the process 
of value creation in the absence of a critical mass of marketplace participants in two0sded 
marketplaces. Findings emerging from an inductive study of ten peer-to-peer 
marketplaces provide evidence and build new theory of the activities host firms pursue to 
create value, recruit initial participants and manage their interactions. A longitudinal 
examination of activities pursued is used to develop theory about two alternative but 
equifinal processes of value creation.  
This study’s findings contribute to the literature on two-sided marketplaces by 
applying a behavioral lens to the study of marketplace strategy. More specifically, the 
emergent typology of nine value-creating activities, and two alternative paths to value 
creation generate new theory about value creation as a process of exercising different 
types and levels of control sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, in collaboration 
with marketplace participants.  
Emergent theory extends resource orchestration theory to entrepreneurial contexts 
and identifies theoretically important differences between resource orchestration in 
established versus entrepreneurial firms. Prevailing views in strategy research assume 
that valuable resources are owned and directly controlled and that resources are 
developed and imbued with value within firm boundaries. In the context of peer-to-peer 
marketplaces, however, control does not necessarily involve ownership or direct 
oversight but is primarily concerned with incentivizing, influencing, monitoring, and 
rewarding marketplace participants for their conformity to appropriate behaviors. Value 
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creation in peer-to-peer marketplaces also has implications for new forms of organizing. 
The dominant view of firms dividing, coordinating and integrating effort of 
organizational members within firms boundaries (Puranam et al, 2014) is called into 
question in contexts such as peer-to-peer marketplaces where external-to-the-firm actors 
voluntarily assume activities typically controlled and carried out by host firms, and where 
firms coordinate external stakeholders and integrate their efforts with those of 
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Introduction (5 minutes) 
1. Background of researcher 
2. Research purpose: I am trying to understand how firms build online communities in 
two-sided markets. 
3. This research program consists of:  
a) Interview (60-90 minutes) 
b) Follow-up telephone and/or email conversations  
 
Consent and Confidentiality (2 minutes) 
1. Present and explain consent form  
2. Offer and explain confidentiality and privacy protection procedures 
 
Main Phase of Interview (45 minutes) 
1. Idea development, motivation, and founder background 
• How did your business idea come about? 
• Why did you want to create this marketplace? 
• What was your prior professional experience and education? 
 
2. Launch and prototype development milestones 
• When did you incorporate?  
• Were you part of an incubator or accelerator? 
• When did you launch the beta site?  
• When did you launch, if at all, a mobile application? 
• Who was part of the founding team at launch? 
• When and with whom did your develop the beta site?  
 
3. Business and technology evolution 
• What key milestones (e.g. first customers, funding, prototype development) did 
you achieve, and when did they occur? 
• What specific features does your technology currently have? 
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• What technology features have you added and removed from earlier versions? 
Why? 
o What changes have you to made to user interface design? Why? 
o How have you decided to make those changes? 
• What technology features are currently in progress? How will they enable the 
growth of the marketplace, if at all? 
• What kinds of features or versions of your technology do you envision creating in 
the future? 
• How does payment work in your marketplace? How was this changed over time? 
o What systems do you have in place to process payments? 
o What do you require users to do before buying or selling an item? 
 
4. Initial Participant Recruitment 
• How have you been able to attract initial marketplace participants?  Could you 
provide examples of specific activities or actions? 
• Who are your current participants? Who are the ideal participants? 
• Which efforts have been the most successful in acquiring new registrants? Which 
ones have been the least successful? 
• What challenges have you encountered in recruiting initial participants? How 
have you solved them? 
• What has been the most and least successful approach to getting participants to 
transact? How have you accomplished it? 
o What kinds of incentives have you given to users? What has worked and 
what hasn’t? 
• What kind of metrics, if any at all, do you use or want to use in the future to track 
progress in your efforts to build recruit more participants? 
• Is user attrition a concern? How do you deal with it, if at all? How do you make 
sure participants return and continue to transact within your marketplace 
• What do you need to further attract more participants? 
• What role, if any at all, have participants played in how you go about growing 
your marketplace? 
o What participant demands have you taken into account and/or 
incorporated in your offering and what demands have you ignored or 
decided not to pursue? Why or why not? 
• What have you learned either about running your business or marketplace 
participants that has been surprising or unexpected? 
• What are the most important issues you and your team are currently trying to 
solve? 
• What challenges keep you up at night? 
 
5. Resource development and evolution 
• Who was on the founding team? 
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• How has your team changed over time?  
• What resources, including funding, have you acquired since you launched? 
o Was kind of funding have you received (e.g., seed, round A etc) and from 
which investors? 
• What are the most important resources you need right now but do not have? 
• How much revenue or how many transactions have you generated so far? 
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